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Abstract
Representation of semantic knowledge is an important aspect of cognitive
function. The processing of concrete (e.g., book) and abstract (e.g., freedom) semantic
concepts show systematic differences on various behavioral measures in both healthy and
clinical populations. However, previous studies examining the difference in the neural
substrates correlating with abstract and concrete concept representations have reached
inconsistent conclusions. This dissertation used multiple novel data analyses approaches
on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, to investigate representational
differences of abstract and concrete concepts and to provide converging evidence that the
representations of abstract and concrete semantic knowledge in the brain rely on different
mechanisms.
Study 1 used meta-analysis method on a combined sample of 303 participants to
quantitatively summarize the published neuroimaging studies on the brain regions with
category-specific activations. Results suggested greater engagement of working memory
and language system for processing abstract concepts, and greater engagement of the
visual perceptual system for processing of concrete concepts, likely via mental imagery.
Study 2 showed successful identifications of single trial fMRI data as being associated
with the processing of either abstract or concrete concepts based on multivoxel activity
patterns in widespread brain areas, suggesting that abstract vs. concrete differences were
represented by multiple mechanisms. Study 3 investigated the classification based on
condition-specific connectivity patterns. Results showed successful identifications of the
iv

connectivity patterns as abstract or concrete for an individual based on the connectivity
patterns of other individuals, both by the connectivity for a priory selected seed regions
as well as by the whole-brain voxel-by-voxel connectivity patterns. The results indicated
the existence of condition-specific connectivity patterns that were consistent across
individuals on a whole-brain scale. Moreover, the results also suggested the
representation of abstract and concrete concepts differs from the semantic association
perspective in addition to differences on coding forms. Study 4 illustrated the application
of MVPA as a cross-modal prediction approach, which is a promising method for further
investigation of semantic knowledge representation in the brain, by investigating the role
of general semantic system on person-specific knowledge.
Overall, the work described in this dissertation provides converging evidence of
the representational difference between abstract and concrete concepts. The differences
are suggested to occur at various levels, including the dependence on modality-specific
perceptual systems, the organization of associations among different semantic-related
systems, and the difficulty and strategy of retrieving contextual information.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Representations of concrete and abstract concepts in the brain are relevant to
understanding language function in both healthy and clinical populations (Eviatar, Menn,
& Zaidel, 1990; Kuperberg, West, Lakshmanan, & Goff, 2008; Mervis & John, 2008).
The concreteness of a semantic concept is commonly defined as the extent to which a
word refers to features of objects that can be sensually experienced. Concepts that are
associated with physical entities are regarded as concrete, while those associated with
mental events are regarded as abstract.
Neuropsychological studies have motivated important proposals on the
organization principles of concepts, while the introduction of neuroimaging techniques
has largely facilitated the investigations on the functional architecture of conceptual
representations. The large body of neuropsychological and neuroimaging literature treats
the two categories of concepts separately, investigating either the organizations of
knowledge about concrete concepts, or the overall difference between abstract and
concrete concept representations. The main studies reported in this dissertation focused
on the latter aspect. The current chapter will first selectively review several prevailing
theories and the empirical neuroimaging evidence on both the representation of concrete
concepts and its difference from the representation of abstract concepts, to offer a context
of the following chapters in this dissertation.
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1.1. Organization of concrete concepts in the brain
1.1.1. Neuropsychological motivations and theories
The conceptual knowledge about objects constitutes a significant proportion of
the concrete concepts. Our knowledge about objects is largely acquired through direct
experience of the material world (Bloom, 2000). The organization of these concepts is
unlikely to be the mere mapping of taxonomies based on definitions (Rosch, 1975).The
way we perceive, interpret, or interact with objects during knowledge acquisition or later
daily experience may influence the representations of object concepts in the brain.
Studies on the neural representation of object concepts have been largely motivated by
cases of brain-damaged patients with category-specific semantic deficits (e.g.,
Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). The development of
theories on concept organization is tightly linked to the observations of selective
impairments of object knowledge in either living or nonliving (mostly manmade objects)
domain. These theories fall into several classes, as is discussed below.
Domain-based views
Since the first reported cases of living/nonliving dissociation (see Forde &
Humphreys, 1999 for an overview), the straightforward account that concepts for
different categories are represented in separate components of the conceptual knowledge
system has been one of the mostly studied proposals. The domain-specific hypothesis
(Caramazza & Shelton, 1998) assumes that object domain provides the first-order
principle of the organization of information in conceptual system. Moreover, the
category-specificity should be observed not only in the semantic but also in the
perceptual areas in the brain (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009). Natural selection pressure has
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been reflected in the specialized neural circuits for processing evolutionarily significant
semantic categories, such as living animate, living inanimate, conspecifics, and tools.
This view has been found to be compatible with a large number of cases of categoryspecific deficits (Capitani, Laiacona, Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003). A limitation of this
theory lies in the criticism of not being panoramic: because the candidate semantic
categories are limited to those with evolution-related history, and because further
hypotheses are needed to specify the rules governing information within these broad
semantic domains (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), the domain-specific model cannot be
the exclusive constraint on conceptual knowledge representation in the brain.
From property-based to modality-specific views
A second line of theories assumes the category-specific deficits reflect the relative
importance of different attributes to different objects. The sensory/functional hypothesis
assumes sensory and functional properties are stored separately in the brain (Warrington
& Shallice, 1984). If knowledge of sensory features is critical to concepts in the living
domain, whereas knowledge of functions is more important to the nonliving domain, the
disproportionate impairments can be attributed to the disruption of one of the modalities.
Neuropsychological predictions according to this hypothesis will be (1) selective
impairments for knowledge of certain type of property will be observed; (2) the
knowledge impairments for a type of property will co-occur with the impairments of
selective categories of objects that are most reliant on that type of property; and (3)
category-specific deficits may also occur in the categories across living/nonliving
boundaries as long as the impaired property knowledge is supposedly critical to the
category, for example, the sensory knowledge impairments may result in the loss of
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knowledge about musical instruments or food in addition to the broad classes of living
things (Warrington & Shallice, 1984).
Supportive neuropsychological evidence for this hypothesis has been found (e.g.,
Basso, Capitani, & Laiacona, 1988; De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1994). However, the observed
relations between the knowledge about property and about category are not always as
predicted. For example, Lambon Ralph et al. (1998) reported a patient with impaired
visual knowledge across living and nonliving domains but without a category-specific
deficit for living things. Such case suggests the existence of sensory/functional
dissociation, but it is at least insufficient to predict the living/nonliving dissociation. On
the other hand, knowledge of different properties within the same modality have been
found to be unequally damaged in some patients, such as the impairments of perceptual
knowledge only for living things (Sartori, Job, Miozzo, Zago, & Marchiori, 1993).
As another line of challenging evidence, some patients with category-specific deficits
showed evenly impaired sensory and functional knowledge (Barbarotto, Capitani, &
Laiacona, 1996; Samson, Pillon, & De Wilde, 1998). Moreover, patients with categoryspecific deficits may not present selective impairments for the knowledge types that are
assumed to be critical (Lambon Ralph, et al., 1998). Such evidence might be a
falsification to the sensory/functional hypothesis, because the impairment of property
knowledge is shown to be unnecessary to the occurrence of category-specific impairment.
However, it is also possible that the critical property to a given category has been
incorrectly assumed in these studies (for example, representing the concept of fruit does
not mostly depend on color information). This alternative explanation mirrors the
questioning about the premise of sensory/functional hypothesis: is it really the case that
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knowing living things mainly depends on sensory information while knowing nonliving
things relies on their functions? Although behavioral studies such as Cree and McRae
(2003) have identified the most salient knowledge type for a given category of object
based on features produced by participants, the explicitly verbalized features may not
reflect the properties, if they exist, that guide the concept representation. Moreover, it is
unclear how the “importance” of a property is defined. The definitive properties for a
category are not necessarily the most featured properties for identifying its members.
Despite these questions, the hypothesis of a sensory/functional dissociation
reflects a general view of property-based organization of semantic knowledge. It assumes
the meaning of a word referring to an object is learned by associating the symbol with
other symbols referring to sensory and motor properties (Humphreys & Forde, 2001;
Warrington & Shallice, 1984). This hypothesis is theoretically suggestive in that it relates
the higher-level conceptual processing to the primary perceptual processes that are well
defined, finite in number, and have relatively clearly understood processing centers in the
brain. The hypothesis of property-based organization has been further associated with the
embodied cognition view (Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg, 1997) by virtue of the emphases on
perceptual and motor information in representing knowledge about objects. The recent
interests to embodied cognition are inspired by a large body of behavioral evidence from
healthy participants. For example, a cost of reaction time has been found when various
semantic tasks required processing of object properties of different sensory modalities
(Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2004). Another example is the interference between
perceptual and semantic information. The implied positions and spatial relations of
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objects in sentences affect the performances in subsequent tasks about objects depicted
by pictures (Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001).
In subsequently developed hypotheses of conceptual representation along the line
of property-based organization, the role of specific sensory modalities has been
emphasized over the sensory vs. functional dichotomy. According to the sensory-motor
model (Martin, 2007; Martin & Chao, 2001), knowledge about properties that comprise
an object is stored close to the sensorimotor systems. Object properties that are invariant
to viewpoint, size, and orientation, such as visual form, color, motion, or actions, guide
the organization of concrete concepts. Instead of being explicitly represented, concepts
arise from weighted activity in brain regions for processing properties.
The connectionist approach
A common approach of the two views discussed above is to identify functionally
and anatomically distinct substrates for different types of semantic knowledge. An
alternative approach is investigating concept representation from the internal structure of
a concept, or in other words, the statistical relations between a concept and certain
features of it. Some of the theories taking the connectionist approach (e.g., Farah &
McClelland, 1991) draw on a multiple semantics assumption, while most of them suggest
a unified conceptual system (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998;
Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001).
This group of theories assumes that important aspects of conceptual knowledge are
represented by semantic features. Concepts are the expressions of how various features
are intercorrelated and how they are connected to the concepts. Therefore, the overlap of
features can account for various relationships between concepts, such as the similarities
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between concepts, the typicality of category membership, etc. (McClelland & Rogers,
2003; Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973).
In the context of a connectionist approach, the category-specific deficits are
derived from differences in the structures or patterns of these feature contents. For
example, Tyler and Moss (2001) addressed the living/nonliving dissociation by focusing
on the facts that (1) deficits for living things are more frequently observed than those for
nonliving things (mainly artifacts), and that (2) brain areas activated for processing living
and nonliving concepts have considerable overlap, with arguably inconsistent regions of
domain-specific activations. Living things have more properties, which are overall more
intercorrelated but less distinctive than artifacts. Moreover, the relations between
perceptual and functional properties in living things are either loose or generic across
categories, whereas artifacts have distinctive and consistent associations between form
and function. Therefore (and based on lesion simulations), compared to artifacts, the
distinctive properties of living things are more vulnerable to damage, whereas the shared
properties of living things are more resilient. This model further suggests that the
organized conceptual system may emerge from the randomly distributed network, with
well-defined structure for similar concepts and less so for concepts with fewer and
loosely intercorrelated properties. The conceptual structural models have shown great
successes in explaining the graded deficits in patients with widespread cortical damage
(e.g., Almor et al., 2009; Silveri, Daniele, Giustolisi, & Gainotti, 1991).
Convergence zones and hierarchical processing
The connectionist view has provided a critical part for the models that suggest a
distributed representation, namely how object concepts arise from the separately
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represented knowledge about properties or features. It should be noted that the
connection-only account is not the only group of models that attempts to address this
question. For example, McClelland and Rogers (2003) have proposed that representation
units that bind object properties may lie in the temporal pole.
The convergence zones theory (Damasio, 1989; Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio,
1997) appeals to distinct modules, i.e., convergence zones, which function as mediational
association cortices to bind sensorimotor information and introspective states from
various sources. The convergence zones are distributed from the posterior to the anterior
cortical regions in a hierarchical style, with the lower-level association areas near the
modality-specific sensorimotor areas and the higher-level association areas in the more
anterior regions that conjoin information from the lower-level regions. These
assumptions are in line with the research with nonhuman primates that suggests
hierarchically structured systems for visual and auditory perceptual feature processing,
with the more anterior regions responsible for the more complex feature conjunctions
(Bussey, Saksida, & Murray, 2005; Tian, Reser, Durham, Kustov, & Rauschecker,
2001).The convergence zones hypothesis has been extended and revised by Simmons and
Barsalou (2003) to make it more compatible with the neuropsychological evidence, such
as proposing sub-types of convergence zones that have more specialized functions for
feature integration.
Interim summary
A number of theories of concrete concept representation derive from research on
category-specific deficits. The domain-specific hypothesis assumes the local
representation of objects by object domains. The modality-specific hypothesis assumes
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distributed representation by sensory and motor modalities. The connectionist view
assumes the distributed representation by semantic features. The hierarchical processing
view assumes additional module that binds increasingly complex features. These views
comprise the starting points of numerous empirical functional imaging studies and the
catalysts of new hypotheses.
1.1.2. Current understanding of conceptual representation of objects: neuroimaging
evidence
The existence of category-specific deficits not only tells about the deficits
themselves in individual cases, but also inspires investigation of the general process of
concept representation in the healthy brain. Functional neuroimaging studies on healthy
participants have become an important complementary approach in offering evidence for
testing and modifying the hypotheses. Compared to neuropsychological studies,
functional imaging is less restricted by explicit behavioral performance, thus more
straightforward to interpretation, and useful in identifying regions automatically involved
in a given task or stimuli. Over the last decade, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) has become a primary tool for identifying the neural correlates of mental activity.
Lesion and neuroimaging studies have identified a number of foci for the perception of
object-related properties in the brain, i.e. the modality-specific areas. For example,
besides the centers for primary processing of visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile,
and motor information, recognizing colors of objects has been associated with the
posterior ventral temporal area, including the fusiform gyrus (Beauchamp, Haxby,
Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999; Zeki & Marini, 1998). The posterior lateral part of the
superior temporal sulcus and middle temporal gyrus is the center for integrating local
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motion signals into the visual perception of the motion of objects (Dupont, Orban, De
Bruyn, Verbruggen, & Mortelmans, 1994; Watson et al., 1993). Is the semantic
knowledge about object-related properties stored in corresponding sensorimotor areas?
Does the concept of an object emerge from these property-based regions, as the
sensorimotor model has predicted; or are the concepts of objects organized by domains
regardless of the sensorimotor properties? The following sections will discuss these
questions based on evidence from neuroimaging studies.
Modality-specific systems in semantic knowledge representation
The relation between the sensorimotor system and object concept representation is
one of the most critical aspects to the view of modality-specific processing. The
intentional retrieval of sensory and motor information that is related to objects has been
associated with brain areas that are close to or overlapping with the sites for the
corresponding primary sensory and motor processing, including color (e.g., Hsu,
Kraemer, Oliver, Schlichting, & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson,
2001; Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995; Simmons et al., 2007),
sound (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Kellenbach, et al., 2001), touch (Goldberg,
et al., 2006), taste (Goldberg, et al., 2006), motion and manipulation (see Martin & Chao,
2001 for a review). These experiments have used tasks that intentionally require the
processing of sensory or motor information, such as property verification (Is a banana
yellow?), judgment (Choose the item whose color is most similar to the color of a
banana), or generation (participants respond to banana with yellow). Moreover,
unintentional but explicit tasks, such as reading words denoting object properties, also
activated modality-specific areas, such as activations in motor cortices for action verbs
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(Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 2004) and ventral temporal cortex for words referring
to forms and colors (Pulvermüller & Hauk, 2006).
Although these results are often considered as supporting the view of the
embodied representation of semantic knowledge, the exact contribution of activation in
the modality-specific areas has been under debate. For one, the correspondence between
sensorimotor areas and semantic stimuli is not always specific enough (see Chatterjee,
2010 for a critical review). Second, it is not clear whether sensorimotor systems engage
in semantic processing in an undifferentiated way. Is their involvement necessary for all
levels of processing? Passive reading of single words may still generate additional
processing, especially in laboratory conditions. Does the embodiment occur regardless of
the internal context of a subject? In fact, the activations in action-related areas during
semantic processing have been found to rely on personal motor experience (Beilock,
Lyons, Mattarella-Micke, Nusbaum, & Small, 2008; Lyons et al., 2010).
A related question is whether the representation of object concepts requires the
modality-specific information that is assumed to represent object-related properties. For
most of us, vision is perhaps the modality we rely on most to acquire information about
and interact with the physical world. The posterior portion of the ventral temporal cortex
along the vision pathway from the occipital cortices is involved in object recognition and
conceptual representation. Within this area, different categories of object have been
related to different activity profiles, as discussed below.
Domain-specificity in the posterior ventral temporal visual stream
The ventral stream of visual processing pathways that extends from the occipital
lobe to the temporal lobe has been recognized to be engaged in object identification.
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Numbers of studies have identified “category-specific regions” in the ventral temporal
areas. The landmark study by Kanwisher and colleagues (1997) first named an
individual-specific region in the fusiform gyrus that selectively responded to faces as the
fusiform face area (FFA). The FFA has been found to show greater activations in the
presence of faces, regardless of the viewpoints, than in the presence of exemplars of
nonliving common objects, other parts of human body, and scrambled faces (generated
by partitioning the original picture of face and shufﬂing the pieces to different locations).
One remaining question is that despite the rigid controls over a number of low-level
visual features, neither objects such as buildings and hands, nor scrambled faces that
serve as the control condition have a similar contour or layout, thus it is possible that the
activation in FFA results from the response toward certain types of shape and structure.
In fact, a shape with these features is very likely to be perceived as a face, which makes a
clear dissociation in experiment manipulation between the concept of face and the visual
structure difficult. This question has been addressed by a subsequent study investigating
the relationship between inverted face and FFA (Kanwisher, Tong, & Nakayama, 1998).
The FFAs of some of the participants showed reduced activation for inverted faces,
which had the same visual features as upright faces except the position but were more
difficult for face recognition. This effect of inversion was stronger and more consistent
across individuals on two-tone face, which disrupted face detection when it was placed
upside-down. Moreover, another study (Yovel & Kanwisher, 2004) clearly demonstrated
that the FFA is selective for face, as a semantic category, rather than for configural
processing. These results dissociated the processing of the face per se from the processing
of low-level visual features.
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The interpretations on the role of the face-specific areas have reached no
consensus. The existence of FFA may indicate a mechanism with qualitatively different
kinds of computation for a particular domain (Kanwisher, et al., 1997), but alternative
explanations are also available. A prominent argument is that the seemingly face-specific
effect reflects the expertise of processing faces compared to other objects, while the
mechanisms are not category-specific (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997). The debate between the
FFA hypothesis and the expertise hypothesis is highly relevant to the general question of
domain-specificity of object representation (for a critical review, see McKone &
Kanwisher, 2005).
A comparison of activation for faces and for another domain of object, which
requires the same level of expertise to detect and recognize, but physically different and
unrelated to faces, will provide key information to the question. Neuroimaging studies
using words as stimuli (Puce, Allison, Asgari, Gore, & McCarthy, 1996), training
participants to become experts to a laboratory-made object (Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson,
Skudlarski, & Gore, 1999), or recruiting participants who were real-world experts to
certain objects (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Rhodes, Byatt, Michie, &
Puce, 2004) have revealed inconsistent results. Crucially, none of these findings indicate
that objects other than faces engage FFA to the same degree as faces do.
In addition to the consistently found face-specific effect (Haxby et al., 1999;
McCarthy, Puce, Gore, & Allison, 1997), selective responses to other categories of
objects have also been identified in distinct regions in the ventral temporal area. These
categories include scenes or spatial layouts (Epstein, Harris, Stanley, & Kanwisher, 1999),
houses (Aguirre, Zarahn, & D'Esposito, 1998), tools (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999), and
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body parts (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001). These findings have jointly
suggested domain-specific organizations for the pre-semantic representation of objects in
ventral temporal areas.
Whether this interim conclusion is also applicable to the representation of
conceptual knowledge of objects? The key to such a question is to dissociate the higherlevel conceptual processing from the object perception or mental image generation. This
can be achieved by using tasks demanding deep processing, presenting stimuli in
symbolic format, investigating concepts that are detached from physical objects, i.e.
concepts related to objects but with higher abstractness, such as the knowledge about
broader domains (living vs. nonliving things) or object-related properties, etc. Chao and
colleagues (1999) found the medial areas of the right fusiform gyrus that were more
active in categorical judgment on the names of tools were also more active in picture
naming of tools compared to animals. Similarly, voxels in the right lateral fusiform gyrus
that were significantly more active in categorical judgment of animals also showed a
greater response in naming animal pictures. This suggests the spatial overlap between
perceptual and conceptual processing of objects. A study using the semantic priming
paradigm showed that a pair of words referring to two related objects elicited reduced
activity compared to a semantically unrelated word pair in several areas, including the
bilateral ventral temporal cortex (Wheatley, Weisberg, Beauchamp, & Martin, 2005).
This provides support for the hypothesis that the ventral temporal area is sensitive to
conceptual processing in the absence of explicit sensory processing. This study also
identified the distinction between living and nonliving things: the lateral part of left
fusiform gyrus responded more greatly to animals than to artifacts. Martin (2007)
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reviewed studies using various tasks and stimuli and argued that the lateral area of
fusiform gyrus is consistently associated with animals and human bodies, whereas the
medial part has been associated with manmade objects. This has been argued to be
consistent with the spatial dissociation of face vs. place perception in terms of the living
vs. nonliving distinction (Martin, 2007; Martin & Caramazza, 2003).
The finding of domain-specific areas for animate and inanimate objects does not
explain the organization principles by itself. For example, Rogers et al. (2005) asked
participants to verify the category of pictures of animals and vehicles. When the task
required basic-level categorization (dog or car), the lateral posterior fusiform gyrus
responded more strongly to animals as expected. However, the preferential response to
animals disappeared when the task required categorization on more specific level
(Labrador or BMW). These results may indicate that the lateral fusiform gyrus represents
object concepts at coarse levels, as the domain-specific hypothesis suggests, but it may
also indicate that the role of this area is detailed discrimination of visual or semantic
features, as the authors concluded.
A study (Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007) that indicated the role of fusiform
gyrus in the interpretation of object animacy shed light on this issue. In this experiment,
participants watched or imagined moving shapes that could be inferred as either animate
or inanimate objects according to two types of biasing backgrounds. When the shapes
were interpreted as animate objects, the lateral portion of left fusiform gyrus as well as
other areas related to social cognition showed increased activity compared to the
condition when the same shapes were inferred as inanimate. Although it is logically
possible that the lateral fusiform activation was due to additional imagery of real living
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objects, this study provides strong suggestion that the organization of a living vs.
nonliving distinction is at least partly driven by the conceptual level dissociations.
The role for central properties in object concept representation
Evidence discussed above shows the subareas in the ventral temporal cortex that
preferentially respond to several categories of objects. However, the representations of
object-related knowledge are not restricted to the ventral temporal stream. The categoryspecific activations are found in more than one continuous area. For example, in addition
to the fusiform gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus has been associated with face and
animal processing. A more prominent example is the activation of the left posterior
middle temporal gyrus in response to artifacts, particularly tools (e.g., Chao, et al., 1999;
Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996; Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Price,
1998). Does domain-specificity hold when taking other relevant systems into
considerations? Parallel to the topography based on animacy in the ventral stream,
activation in the visual motion area has been suggested to be modulated by object
category. The pSTS has been shown to preferentially respond to biological motion (see
Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000 for a review) while the pMTG and the premotor cortex
respond more to the movement of manipulable objects (Beauchamp, Lee, Haxby, &
Martin, 2002, 2003). These studies suggest the left posterior lateral temporal cortex also
represents objects, but only for those with motion as an important or salient property,
such as animals and tools.
Regions in the pSTS/MTG for sound perception showed stronger activation to
visually presented words denoting objects with salient acoustic features (e.g., telephones)
than to those without such features (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008).
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Generating words denoting objects or events that were characterized by visual (e.g.,
animal), motor (e.g., transportation), or somatosensory (e.g., body parts) features were
found to elicit corresponding sensorimotor areas (Hwang, Palmer, Basho, Zadra, &
Müller, 2009). Processing of words referring to objects with strong and unique smells is
found to activate olfactory cortices compared with control words (Gonzalez et al., 2006).
The embedding of certain categories of objects in certain modality-specific areas suggests
the role for critical sensorimotor modalities in the neural representation of objects.
Multimodal areas and hierarchical semantic processing
The above sections argue that only part of the object concept is represented
modality-specifically. Although the representations of objects rely on different modalityspecific systems to different extents, our knowledge about objects comprises information
from multiple properties within and across modalities. How does the brain bind various
properties to form meaningful object representations?
The above section also showed that in the posterior ventral visual stream, the finegrained category-specific effects presented in the pre-semantic processes are blurred but
merged into the coarse living vs. nonliving distinction during concept retrieval. If the
posterior ventral stream shows the distinction by domains, how does the brain represent
the knowledge about objects on the basic level or even individual level?
As described before, the intercorrelations between features of different modalities, such
as appearance and function, are recognized to be important to the object representation
(Tyler & Moss, 2001). How is it realized in the brain?
According to the convergence zone and hierarchical processing models, additional
to the modality-specific areas, the semantic knowledge representation also requires
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certain supramodal systems that are responsible for the complex feature discrimination
and the combination of information across modalities. Two sites in the brain, one at the
pSTS/MTG and the other at the anterior temporal cortex, have been proposed to perform
these functions in different ways.
The left pSTS/MTG. The left pSTS/MTG has been associated with integrating
object-related information from multiple modalities. Pictures of objects or sounds
typically generated by certain categories of objects have found to elicit stronger
activations than meaningless complex stimuli (Beauchamp, Lee, Argall, & Martin, 2004).
Presenting visual and auditory stimuli simultaneously elicited stronger activations than
presenting unimodal stimuli of the same objects (Beauchamp, Argall, Bodurka, Duyn, &
Martin, 2004; Beauchamp, Lee, et al., 2004; Taylor, Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2006).
By using high-resolution fMRI, Beauchamp et al. (2004) revealed heterogeneous
architectures in the STS bilaterally: within the functionally defined multisensory STS
areas based on a standard-resolution fMRI, they found patches that responded
preferentially to auditory or visual stimuli compared to stimuli of the other modality, and
in-between patches that responded equally to both modalities. The authors proposed that
such organization within the multisensory area suggested separate patches for the arrival
of visual and auditory inputs and an integration in the intervening regions.
Although this area was selectively activated for object recognition, it seemed
insensitive to the semantic congruency between inputs from different modalities.
Activations for processing congruent (picture of cat + sound of “meow”) vs. incongruent
(picture of dog + sound of “meow”) stimuli were not different in either an implicit task
(one-back same/different judgment, Beauchamp, Lee, et al., 2004) or an explicit task
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(congruency judgment, Taylor, et al., 2006). This area was also found to respond
indifferently to the living and nonliving domains (Taylor, et al., 2006). Therefore, the left
pSTS/MTG area may serve as a center receiving semantically meaningful visual and
auditory information without binding the information to form integrated concepts.
The left anteromedial temporal cortex. On the other hand, in spite of the
insensitivity of fMRI measures to the activities in the anterior temporal areas due to the
susceptibility artifacts (Devlin et al., 2000; Lipschutz, Friston, Ashburner, Turner, &
Price, 2001), functional imaging studies have provided converging evidence suggesting a
role of the left anterior temporal cortex in multimodal processing of concrete concepts.
Tyler et al. (2004) used a picture naming task that either asked for the name at a basic
level (tiger) or at a domain level (living thing) to manipulate the level of specificity in
differentiating among similar objects. First, when compared to a fixation baseline, both
the basic-level and domain-level naming tasks activated bilateral areas in the inferior
occipital cortex to fusiform gyrus, more prominently in the left hemisphere. When more
lenient thresholding methods were applied, a trend of anteriorly and medially extended
activation, including the perirhinal and entorhinal cortices, additional fusiform areas,
amygdala, and hippocampus, was found in the left hemisphere, only for the basic-level
naming. Second, the direct comparisons between the two conditions showed greater
activations in the left entorhinal and perirhinal cortices for the basic-level than domainlevel naming, while the domain-level naming elicited greater activations in the right
middle frontal gyrus. Third, the differences of percent signal changes between the basiclevel and domain-level tasks progressively increased from no difference along the
anteriorly extended stream. These results suggested the anteromedial temporal area was
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critical for differentiating detailed features in object knowledge retrieval, and also
suggested a posterior-to-anterior stream for processing increasingly fine-grained semantic
features.
The role of the left anteromedial temporal cortex has been further confirmed by a
study using finer-grained categories of objects (Moss, Rodd, Stamatakis, Bright, & Tyler,
2005). Moreover, this study also found that during the basic-level naming, living things
elicited stronger activations than artifacts, which was not shown during the domain-level
naming. In the context of the identified functions for this area, these results were in line
with the assumption that living things share more features, thus requiring more complex
combinations of multimodal features for discrimination.
In addition to the fine-grained semantic processing, the anteromedial temporal
cortex has also been associated with integrating cross-modal perceptual properties into
conceptual representation. This proposal mirrors nonhuman primate studies showing that
the perirhinal cortex receives inputs from multiple sensory modalities (e.g., Suzuki &
Amaral, 1994). The functional difference between the anteromedial temporal cortex and
the pSTS/MTG was identified in a study by Taylor et al. (2006), showing that activities
of the left perirhinal cortex were modulated by object domains and probably semantic
congruency.
Interim summary
Semantic knowledge of an object is at least partly represented within the
modality-specific systems that represent the central properties of the object. Within the
visual processing stream in the posterior ventral temporal cortex, pre-semantic conceptual
representation presents domain specificities for both coarse- and fine-grained categories
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that are likely to be evolutionarily significant (as fine as faces and body parts, and as
coarse as living things). This area is also sensitive to the semantic information of objects.
Objects in the living domain tend to evoke stronger activation in the lateral areas
compared to nonliving objects while the medial areas are more responsive to nonliving
objects. Domain-specific activation profiles are also found in the visual motion area that
represents knowledge about movements that indicate biological or instrumental functions.
The convergence of multisensory information, particularly from the visual and auditory
modalities occurs in the anteromedial temporal cortex and pSTS/MTG. The more anterior
portion of the temporal cortex is sensitive to the more fine-grained semantic
discrimination.
1.2.

Representational differences and relations between abstract and concrete concepts

1.2.1. Motivations and theories
Compared to the object-related concepts, the representation of abstract entities are
less investigated and understood in the empirical studies as well as in the traditional
cognitive theories. By definition, the more abstract a concept is, the more detached it is
from physical entities. In practice, language is arguably the most commonly used vehicle
to convey abstract knowledge. Although research on the organization of concrete
concepts in the brain is closely linked to object perceptions, this approach meets apparent
difficulty in understanding the representation of abstract concepts. Therefore, the amodal
vs. modality-specific debate on the format of conceptual representation has been
unsurprisingly dominated by the former.
Abstract concepts are typically acquired later in development and more vulnerable
to brain degeneration. The concreteness effect, which refers to the observations in a
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variety of cognitive tasks that words representing concrete concepts are processed faster
and more accurately than words representing abstract concepts (see Paivio, 1991;
Schwanenflugel, 1991 for reviews), also suggests a disadvantage for our brain to process
concepts with increased abstractness. The concreteness effect has become an important
clue for the early theories about the representation of abstract knowledge. The dualcoding theory (Paivio, 1991) assumes two independent processes are central to concept
processing. The representations of both concrete and abstract concepts rely on a common
verbal symbolic system, but representation of concrete concepts also involves a process
based on mental imagery, resulting from the high imageability of concrete concepts in
comparison to abstract concepts (book is more easily visualized than freedom). In
contrast, the context availability hypothesis (Kieras, 1978) attributes the concreteness
effect to the assumption that it is easier to assign a context to concrete concepts. This
theory states that only one system is required for the brain to process semantic
information (Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988), indicating the difference
between abstract and concrete concepts is that contextual information is more readily
available to concrete concepts because they are associated with more representational
information and have stronger connections to semantic knowledge than abstract concepts.
The disadvantage of abstract concepts was found to be compensated when both concrete
and abstract words were presented in a sentence context (Schwanenflugel & Stowe,
1989).
According to both theories, abstract concepts are by nature more vulnerable to
brain damage, thus will always be more severely affected if a disproportionate
impairment occurs. This is incompatible with findings of the reversal of concreteness
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effect, i.e., better performances on abstract than concrete concepts in some patients with
brain damage (see the introduction of Papagno, Fogliata, Catricalà, & Miniussi, 2009 for
a review). The dissociation suggests the existence of neural substrates exclusively
involved in the representations of concrete or abstract concepts, challenging the
traditional theories only accounting for the representational advantages for concrete
concepts.
Furthermore, the organization principles of abstract concepts have been argued to
be fundamentally different from those of concrete concepts. Crutch and Warrington
(2005) reported a series of experiments on a patient with semantic refractory access
dysphasia, with which the performance on semantic task is facilitated if the interval
between a response and the subsequent stimulus is increased. A ubiquitously observed
effect on refractory access disorders is the sensitivity to semantic similarities in the
concrete domain: refractoriness occurs not only in the processing of individual concepts,
but also in concepts similar to the previously presented ones. However, such an effect
was not observed for abstract concepts in a spoken word – written word matching task:
the refractoriness remained at the same level whenever the presented abstract words were
synonyms or unrelated, suggesting that abstract words with similar meanings were not
necessarily presented in similar neural spaces as the concrete words do. By contrast,
abstract but not concrete words with associated meanings (exercise, healthy, fitness, etc.)
presented significant interferences with each other, suggesting abstract concepts are
represented in an “associative neural network”.
1.2.2. Implications from activational differences: neuroimaging evidence
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Neuroimaging studies that compare the activation profiles of abstract and concrete
words processing have reached few conclusions on how the underlying mechanisms are
different. Supporting evidence exists for either theory (Binder, Westbury, McKiernan,
Possing, & Medler, 2005; Kiehl et al., 1999; Martin-Loeches, Hinojosa, Fernandez-Frias,
& Rubia, 2001), while other studies show results that are inconsistent with both theories
(Kiehl, et al., 1999; Pexman, Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, & Goodyear, 2007). One
reason of this confusion is the discrepancies in explaining the theories with neuroimaging
language. The cognitive theories explaining the concreteness effect were raised before the
time when functional neuroimaging techniques were widely available. The
neuroanatomical predictions of the theories were derived from early observations in
patients with verbal or imagery deficits. The translations of different theories to
neuroanatomical predictions are sometimes vague and not exclusive from each other. For
example, the dual-coding theory makes few inferences of the activities in the left
hemisphere for concrete compared with abstract concepts, while the context-availability
theory does not predict the activation comparison between concrete and abstract concepts
in the right hemisphere, thus leaving room for post-hoc explanations.
Moreover, some predictions from the original theories have been shown to be
incompatible with the more recent functional neuroanatomical findings. For instance, a
shared prediction of the dual-coding and the context-availability theories is that greater
activation should be observed for concrete concepts in comparison to abstract concepts.
A number of studies only identified regions selectively involved in processing abstract
concepts (Friederici, Opitz, & von Cramon, 2000; Grossman et al., 2002; Jessen et al.,
2000; Kiehl, et al., 1999; Noppeney & Price, 2004; Perani et al., 1999; Pexman, et al.,
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2007). For another example, the dual-coding theory assumes that representation of
abstract concepts is restricted to the language-dominant hemisphere, while concrete
concepts rely on both hemispheres because the image-based system is known to be
bilateral (Paivio, 1986). Although some neuroimaging studies use the hemispherical
asymmetry as a criterion of the involvement of mental imagery process (e.g., Binder, et
al., 2005), the laterality of image generation has been controversial. Compared to
listening passively to abstract words, imagining the appearance of the objects when
concrete nouns were aurally presented was found to activate the inferior temporal lobe,
premotor area and the anterior cingulate gyrus in the left hemisphere (D'Esposito et al.,
1997). Based on the current understanding of the neural machineries for both mental
imagery and concrete object representation (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004;
Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001), simply using the hemispheric asymmetry as the
criterion has been argued to lack specificity (Scott, 2004).
Similarly, different studies have offered different explanations on the predictions
of context-availability from a neural view. Some studies emphasize the difference in the
strength of association with the context between abstract and concrete concepts. For
example, Binder et al. (2005) stated that according to context availability hypothesis, the
neural substrates of abstract and concrete concepts are identical, while activations
correlating with concrete concepts are stronger than those of abstract concepts. Other
studies emphasize the accessibility to context, or the retrieval difficulty. For example,
Fiebach and Friederici (2004) interpreted its prediction as stronger activity for abstract
words in brain regions associated with the retrieval of semantic information, mainly in
the left posterior superior temporal region. The lack of correspondence between early
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theories and neuroimaging language suggests revisions on the theories and cautions on
interpreting the results.
1.3. Multivariate pattern analysis
1.3.1. Motivation
The sections above review studies using neuroimaging techniques to infer how
conceptual knowledge is represented in the brain based on statistical parametric mapping
(SPM),which characterizes region-specific responses by performing statistical analysis on
individual voxels (Friston et al., 1994). Despite the tremendous effectiveness in dealing
with questions of locating brain areas whose activities systematically vary with specific
cognitive process, SPM has its limitation as a univariate approach. Because SPM treats
individual voxels independently with separate general linear models, it is unable to
capture the joint activity patterns grounded in multiple areas. Also, the mass-univoxel
modeling is accompanied by multiple comparisons in statistical contrasts. Stringent
control on the increasing familywise type I error rate impairs the power of studies further.
One of the conventional ways to rescue power in SPM approach is focusing on specific
regions, such as the small volume comparison or regions of interest analysis, instead of
fishing within the whole brain data. However they are not suitable when a clear
anatomical hypothesis is lacking, or when the cognitive processes are not concentrated in
a small number of areas.
With the motivations of detecting spatially distributed information content beyond
single voxels as well as gaining power, multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) has been
introduced as a complementary approach to SPM. In a pioneering work, Haxby and
colleagues (2001) were able to decode the functional architecture during viewing pictures
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of eight commonplace categories of objects in human ventral temporal cortex. This study
showed the ability of MVPA in detecting the difference in distributed response patterns
toward different stimuli in the same region, verifying a theoretical hypothesis that is
difficult to be tested by merely investigating the maxima of single voxels. Follow-up
studies have found consistent evidence that the ventral temporal cortex provides critical
information to accurately identify the categories of object a person is viewing (Hanson &
Halchenko, 2007; Hanson, Matsuka, & Haxby, 2004). A number of MVPA studies (e.g.,
Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haynes & Rees, 2005; Kamitani & Tong, 2005) and reviews (e.g.,
Haynes & Rees, 2006; Norman, Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006; O'Toole et al., 2007;
Pereira, Mitchell, & Botvinick, 2009) following this early exploration have shown the
effectiveness of this method on various topics.
Considering the ways of addressing questions by using MVPA are different from
those using the canonical approach, I will temporally deviate from the topic of concept
representation and briefly overview MVPA methodology. MVPA has prominent
applications in various neuroimaging and neurophysiological data. The following section
will illustrate its application on fMRI data.
1.3.2. A brief introduction on MVPA procedure
The research question and procedure of an MVPA study are different from those
of conventional SPM approach on several aspects due to the differences in goals and
rationales. MVPA deals with the representational content of brain regions while SPM
considers the magnitudes of activity as dependent variable. Therefore, instead of
demonstrating the involvement of brain areas in a particular process, MVPA addresses
questions in two directions: (1) to directly establish a temporary computational models
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characterizing the activity patterns (the reason of being temporary will be discussed later);
and (2) to reversely decipher the neural response patterns in order to relate them to
specific cognitive processes. The latter is sometimes also referred to as decoding,
prediction, classification, or “mind-reading”, as it includes the procedure of indicating
what type of information is being processed given a specific response profile. In practice,
the two directions are often coexistent for the following reasons. If the goal of a study is
to model the activity patterns of different conditions, the classification procedure will
provide a validation that the models are productive, or distinguishable. If the goal is to
decode mental states, the modeling, although being an implicit procedure, is necessary to
achieve the successful decoding. Both the block and event-related designs have been used
in MVPA studies. The greater sensitivity of MVPA enables it to decode the mental states
based on activities in a short period of time, i.e. one or two scans for each event trial.
The features of MVPA have been discussed by far in the frame of comparing to univoxel
approaches. MVPA is apparently not the only multivariate statistical method that has
been applied to neuroimaging data. An important reason for MVPA to be more welcomed
than other multivariate approaches is MVPA directly connect the data pattern to
conditions of a study (which will be referred to as categories) as SPM does. Compared to
exploratory, descriptive, data-driven multivariate methods, such as principal component
analysis or independent component analysis, MVPA is more compatible with the
hypothesis testing paradigm (see O'Toole, et al., 2007 for more detailed and insightful
discussions).
A “typical” procedure of MVPA is usually constituted of the preprocessing,
feature extraction, cross-validation, and significance testing (Figure 1.1). The
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Figure 1.1

Example of the procedure of multivariate pattern analysis.

preprocessing approach is very much the same as in SPM except that spatial smoothing is
not always necessary: Without averaging across neighboring voxels, the data will retain
the joint, fine-grained spatial patterns which may carry important condition-specific
information. However, MVPA may require extra data mining processing before data
enter the major analyses step. Temporally, unlike the SPM which may model a whole
block of scans, MVPA uses a single time point of data by averaging scans in a block, or
selecting single scan with estimated peak of activity in an event-related trial. Spatially, a
feature selection procedure may be included to remove the measures that are unlikely to
carry information. The feature, corresponding to the multivariate in MVPA, can refer to a
subset of voxels as in most cases, independent components (e.g., Douglas, Harris, Yuille,
& Cohen, 2011), connections between pairs of regions, or other variants that are extracted
to represent the data. This procedure is usually important for two main reasons. First,
there are numbers of occasions that not the whole brain is engaged in condition-specific
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activities. Second, from a computational perspective, a better estimate of model requires
a large number of observations (trials) and a small number of variants (voxels or other
features), which is hard to achieve in fMRI studies by nature. Thus, feature selection is
helpful to unburden the computational difficulties. Analogous to the functional localizer
in SPM approach, in order to avoid circular reasoning, feature selection procedure should
never be based on an ad hoc rationale to the categories.
The training and test phases are the modeling and hypothesis-testing procedures.
They are also the estimate and validation of a classifier. Analogous to the general liner
model towards SPM, classifier is a structured algorithm applied to represent the
multivariate data. Before classifier training, the overall dataset will be partitioned in
parallel and assigned to the two phases. Conceptually, the training dataset is constructed
in a high-dimensional space, in which the dimensions correspond to the features. A
classifier training phase is to insert a hyper-plane to separate data of different categories
apart as much as possible. In the test phase, the new, unseen set of data will be mapped
onto the space so that the hyper-plane (classifier) can decide which category each data
point belongs to, based on their locations. Because the actual categories of the test set are
known from the experiment, the classification performance by the hyper-plane can be
compared with the true categories, and evaluated in terms of accuracy.
The above training and test procedure as a whole is called cross-validation. To
make full use of the data and to reduce variability, cross-validation is very often
performed in a recycling way: different subsets of the whole data will be assigned to
training or test sets iteratively, and the overall accuracy will be evaluated across iterations.
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The feature selection should be performed only on the training set in each iteration, then
apply to the test set. This ensures that the classifier modeling is blind to the test set.
A data-specific, random-permutation-based method is usually used to statistically
evaluate the classification accuracy. The null hypothesis is that labels (categories) of the
observations (trials) are meaningless, thus the classifier is trained on nonsense “patterns”,
and the classification procedure is essentially guessing. To simulate the distribution of
this null hypothesis, the same dataset will be trained and tested in the same procedure for
multiple times, but with randomly permuted labels. Therefore, the significance level of
the real accuracy can be estimated by comparing it to the guess distribution.
MVPA procedures may have lots of variations in the specific steps or overall
frame, for example, the analysis of representational similarity may replace the
classification procedure according to the purpose, as long as they present the two
definitional components: the multivariate data analysis approach, and the direct link
between analysis results and experiment conditions.
The advantages of examining information content and high sensitivity hold
promise for addressing questions that are difficulty to deal with by SPM approach, as is
discussed below.
1.3.3. Previous application of MVPA on conceptual representation
Revisiting evidence for category-specificity of concept representation in the ventral
temporal stream
It should also be noted that the category-specificity is a relative effect: categoryspecific regions are also responsive to other categories, with smaller magnitudes. For
example, the FFA is specialized for face perception in terms of the consistent response
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with the largest magnitude over other categories, but it also significantly responds to
objects other than faces (Haxby, et al., 1999; Ishai, Ungerleider, Martin, Schouten, &
Haxby, 1999). Similarly, Chao et al. (Chao, Weisberg, & Martin, 2002) found that
naming pictures of familiar animals or tools elicited reduced activities compared to novel
animals or tools in the ventral occipitotemporal cortices that were not limited to the
corresponding category-specific region of each.
Moreover, the domain-specificity within modality-specific areas as shown in the
previous section is not consistently found by other studies. A review on twenty studies
that used pictures as stimuli to localize the category-specific activities showed
considerable inconsistencies (Gerlach, 2007). Tyler et al. (2003) examined the
representation of domain and property information using words denoting object names
(animals or tools) or actions (biological actions or tool-related actions). Participants were
asked to quickly judge whether each target word was semantically related to (essentially,
whether the object belongs to the same semantic category as) the two cue words. The left
fusiform gyrus, superior and middle temporal cortices were found to be activated by both
object names and their associated actions when compared to the baseline task of letter
string judgment, suggesting words referring to tool and animal implicitly activate the
actions associated with them. The activities in the fusiform gyrus for objects and actions
were largely overlapped, while the activities in the superior and middle temporal cortices
were more extensive for actions than objects. However, this study did not find a domainspeciﬁcity for either object words or action words. In another study (Marques, Canessa,
Siri, Catricalà, & Cappa, 2008), participants were required to make judgment of living
and nonliving things on the same sets of visual and motion properties (“cut trees” for
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both Beaver and Saw). Results showed the visual- and motion-specific effects
respectively in expected areas, but no domain-specific main effect or interaction between
domain and properties was found. Mechelli et al. (2006) argued that the greater activation
in the medial fusiform gyrus for artifacts than animals could be at least partly explained
by the different semantic relevance for the two domains: when semantic relevance were
matched for stimuli in the two domains, the effect of artifacts > animals was greatly
reduced. In short, the domain-specific hypothesis has been questioned that the overlap
between categories is much more significant than the difference, and the exact location of
“object area” is not consistent. The discrepancies across studies may be partly due to the
analysis details. Studies identifying category-specific regions have relied heavily on a
functional localizer by using lenient threshold, followed by region-of-interest analysis
which avoids the stringent correction for familywise error rate. It is also possible that the
locations of category-specific areas lack cross-individual consistency.
Distributed activity patterns in domain-specific ventral temporal areas
Canonical neuroimaging studies based on univoxel activation have identified a
domain-based dissociation in the ventral temporal vision pathway, but left the question of
how numerous categories and individual objects are recognized unanswered. MVPA
studies have contributed to this question by showing distinguishable multivoxel patterns
for different categories within the ventral temporal cortex. Haxby et al. (2001)
investigated the response patterns when participants viewed pictures of living and
manmade objects in seven categories. They hypothesized that the unique representation
of each category was associated with a distinct pattern represented by strong and weak
responses in multiple voxels in the general object cortex. If such category-specific
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patterns exist, it should be possible to distinguish which category of stimuli a participant
was viewing from the data. A correlation-based similarity measure was used to test this
hypothesis, i.e. by measuring whether the response patterns of two independent
observations from the same category were more similar than the patterns evoked by
stimuli from different categories. The patterns for each of the categories were found to be
significantly distinguishable, even when the voxels with maximal response to each
category were excluded from the analyses, suggesting that patterns of non-maximal
responses carry category-related information. On the other hand, in regions with maximal
responses to a certain category, the patterns of response to other categories were still
distinguishable. Thus, the pattern-specificity of an object category is reflected to a much
greater extent than simply maximal response in the object-selective cortex. Specifically,
the representation of faces and objects in the ventral temporal cortex are widely
distributed, with spatial overlapping across categories.
Since this first report of using MVPA to decode the perception of objects, the
functional topographies in the occipital and ventral temporal cortices have been
investigated in more details. A closer looking at the confusability of categories in
classification reveals a primary distinction between animate and inanimate objects, and a
further distinction between small artifacts and houses (Hanson, et al., 2004; O'Toole,
Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005). Viewing or imagining categories and even objects such as
individual faces, scenes, and numbers have been found to activate overlapped voxels, but
with category- or object-specific patterns (Downing, Wiggett, & Peelen, 2007; Weil &
Rees, 2010 p.651).
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The response patterns in the ventral temporal cortex have been further
demonstrated to be structured by the degree of animacy. By measuring the similarity of
multivoxel response patterns toward six animal species from birds, insects, and primates,
Connolly et al. (2012) showed a hierarchical category structure corresponding to the
biological class structure, with insets and primates at the two ends of this continuum.
Bugs elicited cortical activity patterns similar to artifacts, and primates elicited activity
similar to living things in previous studies. Moreover, the cortical representational
similarity was also correlated with participants’ similarity judgment on these species.
These results suggest an animate-to-inanimate gradation represented in the ventral
temporal cortex.
Content-specific representation in early sensory and perceptual cortices
An interesting finding by Connolly et al. (2012) is that the between-species
dissimilarity in the ventral temporal cortex is correlated with the response patterns in V1
cortex but not retinotopic visual cortex. Despite the extensive studies on the primary
sensory systems, the recognized processes can only account for small properties of
activity variances. Recent MVPA studies have identified the roles beyond early sensory
processing in these areas.
Harrison and Tong (2009) showed successful classifications on which of the two
orientations of gratings was held in working memory from activity patterns in the visual
cortex V1 to V4,suggesting the early visual regions contain memorized information of
visual features. Ester and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that the areas showing
differential patterns to visual details held in working memory were not limited to cortices
that corresponded to the retinotopic position of the remembered item. Meyer et al. (2010)
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found content-specific patterns in primary auditory cortex in the absence of auditory
input. Participants watched muted videos of short events that implied sounds of animals,
musical instruments or other ordinary artifacts. In the anatomically defined unimodal
auditory cortices, they were able to identify which content of the videos the participants
saw with accuracies above chance based on the multivoxel patterns but not based on the
mean magnitudes of activities across voxels. Moreover, the significant correlation
between participants’ ratings on how evocative the video was and the classification
performance suggested that the activities at the very early stage of sensory processing
were associated with conscious perceptual experience.
In addition to the information within the same sensory modality, sensory cortices
have also been found to respond to information of other modalities. For example,
different types of natural sounds elicited distinguishable patterns in early visual cortex,
even when the participants were performing an orthogonal word memorizing task to
constrain mental imagery (Vetter, Smith, & Muckli, 2011). Ethofer and colleagues (2009)
found that the voxels sensitive to voices also presented distinguishable patterns for
different categories of emotions conveyed by aurally presented pseudowords. Based on
the voxel-by-voxel correlations of the responses to different stimuli, Peelen et al. (2006)
found similar responses to body parts and biological motion in the body-selective regions
in posterior fusiform gyrus and posterior inferior temporal sulcus.
Overall, these findings suggested the sensory cortices might serve a function in
the representation across modalities. Such implication challenges the traditional view on
the meaning of activity in primary sensory cortices, and further indicates the link between
perceptual and conceptual processing.
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Focusing on semantic knowledge
A large body of MVPA literatures on object representation has focused on the
pre-semantic conceptual representation in the ventral temporal visual stream. These
studies have contributed to addressing the specific questions based on findings and
debates from the univoxel studies. Mitchell and colleagues (2008) tackled the question of
semantic knowledge representation from a different perspective. They hypothesized that
the representational patterns of word meanings in the brain could be associated with the
use of words in large text corpus. The semantic features that distinguish a target word
could be represented by the co-occurrence of certain other words with it in the text corpus;
therefore, the brain activity associated with the target word could be modeled by these
featural words. In this study, a set of 25 verbs representing sensorimotor events related to
objects (e.g. taste, enter, wear, clean) were chosen as the semantic features to represent
60 nouns referring to various categories objects, forming a model for each noun by linear
combination of these features. These models were then trained with the fMRI activity
patterns of a subset of the nouns, thus a brain signature could be inferred for each of the
features. The predicted activity patterns for the left-out nouns based on the trained
computational model were found to successfully match the actual patterns for these
words. This study builds the link between the brain activities with computationalist
approach and shows the possibility of establishing predictive models for the brain
activities associated with arbitrary words.
Another study combining MVPA and text corpus analysis method was able to
generate relevant text from fMRI data when participants were viewing object pictures
(Pereira, Detre, & Botvinick, 2011). In this study, the researchers collected fMRI data
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when participants viewed 60 categories of objects during a semantic processing task.
Meanwhile, they collected 3500 Wikipedia articles relevant to the objects, and extracted a
topic model from the text for each article, which modeled a probability distribution of
words for each topic. The relations of topic models and corresponding brain activity
patterns were then learned by regression model, thus establishing functions of the
probability for different topic models to be predictive for a target brain image. Finally in
the test phase, a set of new brain images that were unseen during the learning phase were
applied to the established models, to reversely generate words that have high probability
of associating with the brain images. Results showed high matches between the fMRI
stimuli category and the generated words, which were also quantitatively validated by
accuracies of classifying brain images into the articles. As the authors proposed, further
development of this approach may offer a new perspective of decoding brain activities
into language outputs.
The representational patterns of words denoting objects have been found
decodable in a widely distributed pattern. Chan et al. (2011) recorded simultaneous EEG
and MEG when participants were asked to judge whether the presented words referred to
a living or nonliving object larger than one foot in any dimension. The representation of
each of the five words could be decoded from EEG and MEG recordings. Moreover, the
patterns that were informative to the discrimination were found in data from the bilateral
anterior temporal, bilateral inferior frontal, and left inferior temporal-occipital sensors,
which was more distributed than the areas localized by univoxel analysis.
Interim summary

38

The application of multivariate pattern analysis on neuroimaging studies has
provided new perspectives to understand conceptual representation in the brain. The
representations of various objects have been found to elicit identifiable distributed
response patterns in the ventral temporal cortex. In line with the finding of locational
differences of the peak activations for living and nonliving objects, the semantic
similarities on animacy between objects are likely to be encoded in the multivoxel
patterns in the posterior ventral temporal cortex. Multivariate patterns in certain early
sensory systems also present cross-modal content-specific information, suggesting that
conceptual representation may occur at early stages of processing. Another important
implication from multivariate studies is that the brain areas conveying informative
patterns associated with semantic concepts are more widely distributed than thought.
1.4.

Motivations for the current work

The critical new findings on the perpetual and semantic representations of
concrete concepts have provided important insights and challenged some of the
traditional perspectives on neural representation of concepts to a great extent. By contrast,
how abstract concepts are represented in the brain is less studied. As a preliminary step,
using the current findings on the representation of concrete concept as a scaffold to
understand abstract concepts appears to be an effective approach and has been
implemented in previous studies. What conclusion can we draw from the extant literature
examining the representational differences between abstract and concrete concepts? How
would MVPA offer further information on this question, and what would be the
implications on previous findings? How could MVPA, combined with other data analysis
methods, answer questions that are difficult to be tested by the canonical methods? The
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general goal of this dissertation was to provide converging evidence that the neural
representations of abstract and concrete semantic knowledge rely on multiple different
mechanisms. Specifically, it aimed to address the following four questions:
Chapter 2: According to previous neuroimaging studies, what brain regions
consistently show activational differences for representing abstract and
concrete concepts?
Chapter 3: Can multivoxel activity patterns be used to decode fMRI data associated
with abstract or concrete concept processing on a single trial basis? How
will the results inform us about the mechanisms of abstract and concrete
concept representation?
Chapter 4: Does the functional connectivity associated with abstract or concrete
concept processing show distinguishable patterns that are consistent across
individuals?
Chapter 5: How can MVPA be applied as a cross-modal prediction approach to
investigating the role for semantic memory in other cognitive process?
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Chapter 2
Meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on the representational differences
between abstract and concrete concepts
2.1.

Introduction

The review of neuroimaging evidence on the representational difference between
abstract and concrete concepts (section 1.2.2) suggests considerable discrepancies across
studies (also see Figure 2.1). Typically, a single neuroimaging experiment does not have
enough power to reveal the neural substrates of a cognitive process, partly due to the
limited sample size. Desmond and Glover (2002) have found that to detect a signal
change of 0.5% with 80% power, approximately 25 participants are necessary, and many
studies have far fewer participants than that (Thirion et al., 2007). A number of studies
examining the neural representation of abstract and concrete concepts have been
conducted, and it is possible to examine the consistency among results using a
quantitative approach. Two studies (Fiebach & Friederici, 2004; Pexman, et al., 2007)
reviewed the reported activity coordinates in relevant studies; Fiebach and Friederici
(2004) also offered an integrated visualization of these peaks in one brain template.
Binder et al. (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009) performed a meta-analysis of
functional neuroimaging studies on semantic processing, and identified representational
differences in abstract and concrete concepts. The aim of the current study is to clarify
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Figure 2.1
Activation peaks for abstract vs. concrete representation from 19 studies
(Table 2.1) are shown on the brain template. © 2013 Human Brain Mapping

the differences in neural representation of abstract and concrete concepts by integrating
existing neuroimaging evidence through meta-analysis. Multilevel kernel density analysis
(Etkin & Wager, 2007) was applied to evaluate the activation consistency across
published neuroimaging studies of abstract and concrete concept representation.
2.2.

Methods

2.2.1. Study selection
Peer-reviewed journals in PsycARTICLES, PsycCRITIQUES, PsycINFO, Web of
Science and Psychology & Behavioral Sciences Collection databases were searched for
neuroimaging studies of abstract and concrete concepts. In addition, we searched the
reference lists of identified studies to ensure inclusion of all relevant studies fitting our
criteria. To compare abstract and concrete concepts directly, the criteria for study
inclusion were (1) participants were healthy adults; (2) the selected studies reported the
peak activations in Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) or Talairach coordinates
(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) in either condition, i.e., brain regions where concrete
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concepts showed greater activations compared to abstract concepts (concrete > abstract)
or the reverse (abstract > concrete); (3) contrasts were performed at a whole brain level
(i.e., not at a region-of-interest level). These criteria resulted in a total of 303 participants
across nineteen studies eligible for inclusion in the meta-analysis (Table 2.1).
2.2.2. Multilevel kernel density analysis (MKDA)
The multilevel kernel density analysis is a coordinate-based meta-analysis method
where the statistical indicator is the probability of activation of a given voxel in the brain
(Kober et al., 2008; Wager, Lindquist, & Kaplan, 2007; Wager, Lindquist, Nichols,
Kober, & van Snellenberg, 2009).The general null hypothesis is that peak coordinates of
activated regions are randomly distributed. If the number of nearby active peaks for a
peak coordinate is greater than the number expected by chance, the null hypothesis is
rejected. A number of meta-analysis methods are available; the MKDA method was
selected for its several advantages. First, MKDA emphasizes the multi-level hierarchy of
the data: multiple peaks are nested in a contrast, and multiple contrasts are nested in a
study. Second, MKDA allows weighting contrasts by study sample size and quality.
Compared with other commonly used meta-analysis methods in brain imaging
(e.g., ALE, Turkeltaub, Eden, Jones, & Zeffiro, 2002), this method prevents the result
from being dominated by any single study with a large number of reported activations. It
has the ability to weight the included studies by the number of participants and the
quality of analysis based on random or fixed effects designs, such that studies with fewer
participants or fixed effects designs are given less weight while studies with a larger
numbers of participant or random effects designs are given more weight. Finally, the
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Table 2.1

Studies included in the meta-analysis

Imaging Number of Random or
Input
Study
modality participants fixed effect Materials
modality
Mestres-Misséet al., 2008 3T fMRI
15
Random
Sentence pairs Visual

Task
Recognition

Tettamanti et al., 2008

3T fMRI

18

Random

Sentences

Auditory

Passive listening

Pexman et al., 2007

3T fMRI

20

Random

Words

Visual

Semantic categorization
(consumable or not)
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Fliessbach et al., 2006

1.5T fMRI

21

Random

Words

Visual

Recognition

Harris et al., 2006

1.5T fMRI

20

Random

Words

Visual

Semantic judgment
(positive or negative)

Binder et al., 2005

1.5T fMRI

24

Random

Words

Visual

Lexical decision

Sabsevitz et al., 2005

1.5T fMRI

28

Random

Word triads

Visual

Semantic similarity
decision

Wallentin et al., 2005

1.5T fMRI

18

Random

Sentences

Visual &

Sentence comprehension

Auditory
Fiebach&Friederici, 2004 3T fMRI

12

NA

Words

Visual

Lexical decision

Noppeney& Price, 2004

2T fMRI

15

Random

Word triads

Visual

Semantic similarity
decision

Whatmough et al., 2004

PET

15

NA

Word pairs

Visual

Semantic similarity
decision (read aloud if the
pair is similar in
meanings)

Grossman et al., 2002

4T fMRI

16

Fixed

Words

Visual

Semantic judgment
(pleasant or not)
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Friederici et al., 2000

3T fMRI

14

NA

Words

Visual

Semantic categorization
(syntactic task: noun or
function word;
semantic task: concrete or
abstract)

Jessen et al., 2000

1.5T fMRI

14

Fixed

Words

Visual

Memory encoding

Wise et al., 2000*

PET

18

Fixed

Words

Auditory

Passive listening

Fixed

Word triads

Auditory

Semantic similarity

Fixed

Words

Visual/

decision sample

Auditory

Passive listening/viewing

Kiehl et al., 1999

1.5T fMRI

6

Fixed

Words

Visual

Lexical decision

Perani et al., 1999

PET

14

Fixed

Words

Visual

Lexical decision

Mellet et al., 1998

PET

8

Fixed

Words with

Auditory

Mental image generation

definitions

(concrete)& passive
listening (abstract)

D’Esposito et al., 1997

1.5T fMRI

7

NA

Words

Auditory

Mental image generation
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(concrete) & passive
listening (abstract)
* Relevant results taken from multi-study analysis conducted by Wise at al. (2000)

MKDA test statistic offers a straightforward interpretation as the weighted proportion of
activated contrasts in a kernel around each voxel (Kober, et al., 2008).
For this meta-analysis, relevant study variables were sample size, analysis type
(fixed or random effects), and peak coordinates in the contrasts concrete > abstract and
abstract > concrete. We retained significance criteria set by individual studies. For those
studies using multiple tasks for one contrast, data from only one task were retained to
avoid inclusion of data from the same participants more than once (however, we cannot
guarantee against data from the same participants being reported in different studies).
Analyses were performed in Matlab (Mathworks, Naticks, MA) based on the MKDA tool
package created by Wager and colleagues (http://wagerlab.colorado.edu/tools). Peaks
from each study were convolved with a spherical kernel of 10 mm radius (kernels of 5
mm and 15 mm were also investigated). The studies were weighted by the number of
participants (N) and type of analysis (δ):

where c is the index factor for the number of comparison maps I (Kober, et al., 2008).
Studies that used random effects analysis had an adjusted weight of 1.0 and studies that
used fixed effects, or when analysis type was unknown, had an adjusted weight of .75
(Kober, et al., 2008). The test statistic P represents the proportion of studies that found
significantly active voxels within the 10 mm radius of each voxel. The threshold for
statistical significance was determined using a Monte Carlo simulation procedure with
5000 iterations; increasing the number of iterations to greater than 5000 did not change
the results. The significance threshold was set at the proportion exceeding 95% of the
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Monte Carlo simulation maxima and controlled by familywise error (FWE) rate. In
addition, we examined FWE-corrected results based on cluster extent.
2.3.

Results

Meta-analysis results indicated different neural representation patterns for abstract
and concrete concepts (Figure 2.2). Regions with significant proportions of stronger
activation for abstract compared to concrete concepts were in the inferior frontal gyrus
(IFG) and middle temporal gyrus (MTG) in the left hemisphere. Regions that showed
stronger activation for concrete concepts were found in the left precuneus,
parahippocampal gyrus, posterior cingulate, and fusiform gyrus (Table 2.2). These results
were robust to changes in kernel size. Additional activated foci corrected on cluster
extent at the 10 mm kernel were located within these regions. Applying a 15 mm kernel
resulted in additional regions for each of the contrasts. Abstract concepts elicited greater
activation in the left precentral gyrus, whereas concrete concepts were more strongly
activated in left superior occipital gyrus, angular gyrus and culmen.
2.4.

Discussion

This study used a multilevel kernel density method to conduct a meta-analysis on
nineteen neuroimaging studies to investigate the neural representation of abstract and
concrete concepts. Although the results of these studies were varied, the meta-analysis
presented a consistent tendency for representational difference. Results suggest a greater
engagement of the verbal system for processing of abstract concepts, and a greater
engagement of the perceptual system for processing of concrete concepts.
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Figure 2.2
Meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on abstract and concrete semantic
concept representation. Color map indicates the weighted probability of activation for a
given area across individual studies. © 2010 Human Brain Mapping
Concrete > Abstract
The comparison of concrete > abstract concepts showed significant consistent
activation in the left precuneus, posterior cingulate, parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform
gyrus and culmen, with a trend toward the left temporal, occipital and parietal regions
that are around the angular gyrus (Figure 2.2). These results imply greater engagement of
object and mental imagery processing in concrete compared to abstract concept
representation.
The left fusiform and parahippocampal gyrus have been found to contribute to the
processing of visual, imageable spatial property knowledge during explicit semantic tasks
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Table 2.2

Consistently activated foci across studies (p ≤ 0.05, FWE corrected)

MNI
Region

Number of

x

y

z

voxels

-48

18

-2

738

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

-50

20

4

373

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

-42

20

-4

138

Middle Temporal Gyrus

-52

10

-18

68

Superior Temporal Gyrus

-48

18

-10

117

Superior Temporal Gyrus

-48

10

-8

42

Middle Temporal Gyrus

-52

8

-32

37

Middle Temporal Gyrus

-58

-42

-4

7

Precuneus

-34

-76

34

147

Posterior Cingulate

-12

-58

12

111

Posterior Cingulate

-14

-56

12

45

Posterior Cingulate

-10

-62

14

41

Posterior Cingulate

-12

-56

6

25

Fusiform Gyrus

-40

-52

-22

16

Parahippocampal Gyrus

-32

-32

-20

8

Parahippocampal Gyrus

-28

-34

-20

1

Abstract > Concrete
Left

Inferior Frontal Gyrus

Concrete > Abstract
Left
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(Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005; Wallentin, Østergaard, Lund,
Østergaard, & Roepstorff, 2005). Although the increased activation of the left fusiform
gyrus for concrete concepts might be confounded by task differences rather than the
concreteness difference in some studies (D'Esposito, et al., 1997; Mellet, Tzourio, Denis,
& Mazoyer, 1998), this left fusiform activation effect was also found in the concrete >
abstract comparison by using a precisely controlled semantic similarity task (Sabsevitz,
et al., 2005). Moreover, the anterior fusiform gyrus was associated with the activation of
several competing alternatives associated with the target concrete word in looking for the
matching concept (Mestres-Missé, Münte, & Rodriguez-Fornells, 2008), which was
compatible with the findings of this area in retrieving complex knowledge about objects
(p19, section 1.1.2).
The left parietal lobe is predominant in generating mental images, and activation
in parietal and occipital lobes has been attributed to different mental imagery tasks
(Kosslyn, et al., 2001; Sack, Camprodon, Pascual-Leone, & Goebel, 2005). Specifically,
the precuneus has been associated with memorizing verbally described scenes which
requires mental image generation (Mellet et al., 2000). The comparison of concrete
concepts to abstract concepts also elicited activity in the left supramarginal gyrus and
posterior cingulate. The posterior cingulate has been associated with mental imagery
processes (Johnson et al., 2006; Kilts, Gross, Ely, & Drexler, 2004). This region has also
been linked with episodic and visuospatial memory function (Aggleton & Pearce, 2001;
Epstein, Higgins, Jablonski, & Feiler, 2007; Rudge & Warrington, 1991), possibly
because mental imagery plays a role in those processes. However, others have suggested
that the bilateral posterior cingulate is semantically more engaged in abstract information
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processing (Pexman, et al., 2007; Tettamanti et al., 2005). This opposite effect may be
due to the deactivation of this region in response to concrete concepts (Ghio &
Tettamanti, 2010).
Abstract > Concrete
Consistently greater activities for processing abstract than concrete concepts were
found in the left inferior frontal gyrus and left anterior temporal lobe (ATL) centering at
the middle temporal gyrus (Figure 2.2). The anterior inferior portion of IFG has been
linked to verbally-mediated semantic knowledge processing (Goldberg, Perfetti, Fiez, &
Schneider, 2007; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintun, & Raichle, 1988). Semantic task
requirements have been shown to alter activity in this area (Zatorre, Evans, Meyer, &
Gjedde, 1992). Fliessbach et al. (2006) posited that the increased left IFG activation
associated with abstract words reflects more strategic retrieval of semantic knowledge.
This effect on semantic processing in the IFG has been dissociated from the effect of task
difficulty, and it has been argued that IFG may act as a specialized central executive area
for semantic retrieval (Demb et al., 1995; Noppeney & Price, 2004). The crucial role of
the left inferior frontal area for abstract words processing has been further confirmed in a
TMS study (Papagno, et al., 2009): task performances were hurt after the stimulation in
left inferior frontal areas only when the participants were making lexical decision on
abstract words.
The left IFG has also been implicated in phonological processing during working
memory tasks (Fiebach & Friederici, 2004). Lesions to the left IFG produce deficits in
phonological and syntactic processes (Bookheimer, 2002). Sabsevitz et al. (2005)
proposed that activation in the more posterior parts of the frontal lobe by abstract
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concepts may represent phonological working memory processing, while the more
anterior regions of the inferior frontal gyrus may play a role in the putative verbal
semantic system. Binder et al. (2005) suggested that the stronger left IFG activation
reflects the additional semantic processing for abstract words compared to concrete
words during a lexical decision task, as abstract words are held in working memory in
phonological form to a greater degree than concrete words. These inferences suggest that
neural representational differences between abstract and concrete concepts might also be
ascribed to phonological processing differences caused by processing difficulty. Such
difficulty is likely to be intrinsic to the representation of abstract concepts rather than
driven by task.
The role for ATL in abstract concepts processing presented in neuroimaging
studies has also been demonstrated in a TMS study (Pobric, Lambon Ralph, & Jefferies,
2009). Although the preferential response to abstract concepts in this area has been
argued to reflect the difference in retrieval strategies (Noppeney & Price, 2004), this
effect has been found in studies requiring superficial or deep processing in the tasks using
fMRI or PET scans (Table 2.3), suggesting the activational differences were due to the
difference in neural representations per se, rather than in the retrieval processes. Pexman
et al. (2007) found the greater activation in this area for abstract concepts, however, when
the words with more than one meaning were excluded from the test, the difference were
only found in the posterior area of the brain, which mirrored the findings in object
concept representation that the anterior temporal area is responsive to detailed
discrimination of object (e.g., Tyler, et al., 2004. See section 1.1.2 for detailed
discussion).
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Table 2.3
Studies that found preferential activations in the left anterior temporal lobe for processing abstract compared to
concrete concepts.
Imaging

Laterality of

Study

modality

Task

activations

Noppeney & Price, 2004

fMRI

semantic similarity judgment

Left

Goodyear, 2007

fMRI

semantic categorization

Left

Tettamanti et al., 2005

fMRI

passive listening

Left

Medler, 2005

fMRI

lexical decision

Left

Perani et al., 1999

PET

lexical decision

Bilateral

semantic similarity judgment

Bilateral

Pexman, Hargreaves, Edwards, Henry, &

Binder, Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, &
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Sabsevitz, Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005 fMRI
Wallentin, Østergaard, Lund, Østergaard, &
Roepstorff, 2005

fMRI

sentence comprehension

Bilateral

Mellet, Tzourio, Denis, & Mazoyer, 1998

PET

silent reading or mental imagery generation

Right

Taken together, the consistent activation across studies resulting from processing
of concrete compared to abstract concepts suggest the representation of concrete concepts
relies more heavily on the visual perceptual and mental imagery system. The greater
involvement of left IFG and ATL in processing abstract concepts is likely to suggest that
the processing of abstract concepts is more demanding in retrieving relevant knowledge
and discriminating among the competitors.
Potential factors influencing results discrepancies among studies
The meta-analysis results revealed the consistent difference between the neural
representation of abstract and concrete concepts across studies. However, not all studies
used in meta-analysis reported activations in regions identified by the meta-analysis. For
instance, the most consistently reported region, the left IFG in abstract > concrete
comparison, was found only in ten out of the nineteen studies. On the other hand, some
other brain regions that were reported by several studies were not identified by the metaanalysis results. Some of these regions were in close proximity to the consistently
activated regions or were right hemisphere homologues, such as the inferior temporal
gyrus (Mellet, et al., 1998; Sabsevitz, et al., 2005; Tettamanti, et al., 2008), or the right
MTG for abstract > concrete comparison (Mellet, et al., 1998; Pexman, et al., 2007;
Wallentin, et al., 2005). Additional regions were not identified by the meta-analysis,
including the superior frontal gyrus for the abstract > concrete comparison (D'Esposito,
et al., 1997; Pexman, et al., 2007; Sabsevitz, et al., 2005; Wallentin, et al., 2005), or the
precentral gyrus for the concrete > abstract comparison (Mellet, et al., 1998; Sabsevitz,
et al., 2005; Wallentin, et al., 2005). The effects of task and stimuli may have contributed
to the discrepancies in results, as discussed below.

55

Effects of task. One might argue that the type of task used to elicit semantic
processing can affect neural activation. For example, the relation of the left IFG
activation to working memory (Binder, et al., 2005; Fiebach & Friederici, 2004;
Sabsevitz, et al., 2005) makes it reasonable to assume a moderation effect of task load on
this region. To determine the effect of task on the representation of concepts, we
conducted additional meta-analyses examining the above contrasts according to task type.
We divided tasks into superficial (passive listening and lexical decision on words and
pseudowords) or deep processing (semantic categorization, semantic judgment and
semantic similarity) categories. Several studies using tasks, such as recognition, were not
included in this additional analysis because they did not fit our selection criterion as
either superficial or deep processing tasks. However, the numbers of studies in the two
groups were too small (7 and 8 respectively out of 19 studies) to detect consistent effects
of task across the included studies.
Effects of stimuli. The materials were similar across studies, so the form of the
stimuli was unlikely to have an effect on our results. The stimuli used in individual
studies were single words (real and pseudo), word groups or sentences. Sixteen studies
used words while three used whole sentences as stimuli. Most studies presented the
stimuli visually; also six studies presented auditory stimuli, some of which used both
presentation modalities (Table 2.1).
The effects of organizations of semantic categories in the brain have long been
discussed (Bookheimer, 2002). The semantic categories selected to represent abstract or
concrete concepts varied among studies. Most studies had one general abstract and one
general concrete concept category, whereas some others used more specific subcategories.
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For example, Noppeney et al. (2004) used one semantic category for abstract concepts
and three (sound, visual or hand motion) for concrete words; Harris et al. (2006) used one
category for concrete and two (metaphysical or mental state) for abstract words. Regions
identified by the current meta-analysis, such as the fusiform gyrus, have been associated
with object recognition and naming (Bookheimer, Zeffiro, Blaxton, Gaillard, & Theodore,
1995). The evidence raises the question of whether the representational differences
between abstract and concrete concepts are content specific, in which case the change of
specific word category would change the patterns of representational difference (Martin
and Chao 2001). This question could be tested by including diverse subcategories in both
abstract and concrete conditions.
Stimuli characteristics such as the word frequency, length, familiarity, and
phonological or orthographic match between abstract and concrete words can also be
critical. A lower average word frequency of abstract words might activate additional
regions not associated with semantic differences. In some studies the stimuli were not
balanced on these factors, possibly due to the difficulty in finding semantically suitable
words. As a consequence, the differences in activation may be attributed to missing
controls. One example is the debate concerning the role of the superior temporal gyrus.
The left superior temporal gyrus was consistently activated across studies for abstract >
concrete concepts, but not all studies reporting this region controlled for phonological
factors. In fact, it recently has been argued that the superior temporal gyrus may be
engaged in phonological processing rather than semantic comprehension(Bradley &
Mark, 2008; Graves, Grabowski, Mehta, & Gupta, 2008).
Meta-analysis methodology
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Meta-analysis combines data from multiple studies, resulting in a large total
number of participants. The total number of participants included in the current analysis
was 303, a number far beyond what is feasible within a typical neuroimaging study.
MKDA was selected because it has several advantages suited to the investigation of
representational differences for abstract and concrete concepts. It allowed weighting
studies by the sample size and analysis type, and the results of MKDA provided an
intuitive interpretation, representing the proportion of studies activating within the chosen
radius of a voxel (Kober, et al. 2008).
Despite its clear advantages, meta-analysis has some inherent limitations. Because
the meta-analysis was based on spatial coordinates from neuroimaging data, it was
limited to PET and fMRI studies, and excluded EEG/ERP studies despite the large body
of literature in that field. In addition, coordinate-based meta-analysis methods such as
MKDA incorporate information only from published coordinates. Thus, these methods do
not account for different within-study variability and cannot model random variation
across studies (Salimi-Khorshidi, Smith, Keltner, Wager, & Nichols, 2009).
2.5.

Conclusion

This experiment has identified meaningful and consistent differences in the neural
representation of abstract and concrete concepts by using meta-analysis to combine data
from 303 participants across nineteen published studies. Abstract concepts elicit greater
activity in the left inferior frontal gyrus and anterior middle temporal gyrus compared to
concrete concepts, while concrete concepts elicit greater activity in the posterior cingulate,
precuneus, fusiform gyrus and parahippocampal gyrus compared to abstract concepts.
These results suggest greater engagement of the working memory and verbal system for
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processing of abstract concepts and greater engagement of the perceptual system for
processing of concrete concepts, likely via mental imagery.
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Chapter 3
Decoding abstract and concrete concept representation based on single-trial
fMRI data
3.1.

Introduction

Although the meta-analysis results offer reliable evidence of the cross-study
consistency, the considerable disagreements of results among these studies are still
alarming: visualizing peak activations from nineteen studies recruited in the metaanalysis revealed distributed locations for the processing differences (Figure 2.1). The
neural representational differences of abstract vs. concrete concepts were interpreted with
various factors. The difference may occur during concept learning or semantic memory
encoding (Jessen, et al., 2000), or is driven by the semantic retrieval strategy rather than
the representation per se (Fiebach & Friederici, 2004; Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito,
Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). The explicit task requirement of thinking of concrete concepts
may call for a more imagery-oriented retrieval approach, while representing abstract
concepts may introduce more verbal associations. Intrinsic difficulty of processing
abstract compared to concrete concepts may also contribute to the neural representational
differences. Because abstract concepts are less imageable, representing abstract concepts
may occupy the working memory to a larger degree (Binder, et al., 2005). Whether these
discrepancies are due to study idiosyncrasies, or whether they in fact do reflect the
abstract vs. concrete processing differences as well, is unclear.
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Using multivariate pattern analysis to identify category-specific concept representation
MVPA is an ideal approach for investigating if the content of concept
representation can be accurately inferred from individual trials of data. Most MVPA
studies on concept representation used pictorial stimuli (Carlson, Schrater, & He, 2003;
Cox & Savoy, 2003; Hanson & Halchenko, 2007; Hanson, et al., 2004; Haxby, et al.,
2001; O'Toole, et al., 2005; Polyn, Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005; Shinkareva et al.,
2008). Only a few studies have applied MVPA to decode semantic concept
representations of concrete objects based on verbal stimuli (Chan, et al., 2011; Just,
Cherkassky, Aryal, & Mitchell, 2010; Shinkareva, et al., 2011). Compared to visual
depictions of objects, verbal stimuli are more independent of visual perception and can
refer to abstract concepts. Whether representation of abstract concepts can be
distinguished from concrete concepts using MVPA methods is unclear. In this work we
extend the previous MVPA findings on concept representation by including the abstract
category that is less dependent on perceptual or motor experiences. The purpose of this
study was twofold. First, we explored whether MVPA methods could be used to identify
single trials as abstract or concrete within each individual by decoding functional patterns
of whole brain activity, thus extending previous MVPA studies of concept representation
to abstract concepts. We also examined where the discriminating information between
abstract and concrete concepts is located in the brain by focusing at the spatially localized
anatomical brain regions that contained sufficient information for identification of
abstract or concrete concepts on average across participants. Second, we investigated
whether the representations of abstract and concrete concepts are similar across
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individuals by training the classifier on all but one participant and then predicting single
trials as abstract or concrete in the left out participant.
3.2.

Methods

3.2.1. Participants
Thirteen participants (six female) from the University of South Carolina
community participated in this experiment and gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Institutional Review Board at the University of South Carolina.
Participants were right-handed, healthy adults and native English-speakers.
3.2.2. Materials
Stimuli were word triplets comprised of semantically similar nouns from two
concrete (tools and dwellings) and two abstract (cognition and emotion) categories. Each
category contained four exemplars, with four different words in each exemplar. For
instance, the words knife, scalpel, razorblade and cutlass composed the exemplar cutting
object within the concrete category tools. For each exemplar, six different triplets were
selected from all possible permutations of the four words. Because the six triplets in each
exemplar referred to the same semantic concept, these triplets were regarded as
repetitions of the same exemplar. The sixteen exemplars were each presented six times,
with each repetition composed of a unique list of triplets, generating 96 triplets in total (4
categories × 4 exemplars × 6 repetitions). Triplets were balanced between the abstract
and concrete categories on word frequency (MAbstract = 27.86 and MConcrete = 31.98, t(94) =
-0.53, p = .60) and word length (MAbstract = 7.25 and MConcrete = 6.83, t(94) = 1.84, p = .07).
3.2.3. Procedure
While being scanned, the participants were asked to make judgments on
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semantically similar written words, analogous to the synonym judgment paradigm
(Breedin, Saffran, & Coslett, 1994; Noppeney & Price, 2004; Sabsevitz, et al., 2005). In
each trial, a word triplet was presented for three seconds, followed by a seven-second
fixation period. For each triplet, participants were asked to decide during the three-second
triplet presentation which of two words at the bottom of the display was more similar to
the word shown at the top. During the presentation of the seven-second fixation, the
participant was instructed to clear the mind and fixate on the cross at the center of the
screen. The task was designed to prompt careful evaluation of each item and its
properties, thus implicitly eliciting the semantic representation of the presented exemplar.
A long fixation trial of 24 seconds was presented after each repetition of the sixteen
exemplars. Participants were prompted by the word “Ready?” following the long fixation
to indicate the beginning of the next repetition. The whole experiment was completed in
two scanning sessions, with three repetitions in each session.
3.2.4. MRI acquisition
Functional images were acquired with gradient echo EPI on a Siemens 3T Trio
scanner at the McCausland Brain Imaging Center at the University of South Carolina
with the following parameters: TR = 2200 ms, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, voxel size =
3 × 3 × 3.6 mm3.
3.2.5. FMRI data preprocessing
The data were processed using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Data for each
participant were corrected for head movement by aligning images to the first volume
based on a six-parameter rigid body transformation. The head movement in any direction
of any participant was smaller than 1.5 mm. The motion-corrected images were then
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normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template and re-sampled to 3×3×3
mm3 voxels.
3.2.6. MVPA methods
The MVPA analysis steps employed in this work are similar to those that have
been successfully used in other MVPA studies (Mitchell, et al., 2008; Shinkareva, et al.,
2008). Classifiers were trained on the mean percent signal change (PSC) of functional
activity for each word triplet in the training set to identify the cognitive states associated
with processing abstract and concrete concepts. For each participant’s data, the mean
PSC of each voxel was the ratio of signal difference between word triplets and the
baseline to the baseline signal. The baseline was computed from the averaged signal in
the long fixation trials. The signal of each triplet was computed by averaging two
volumes offset 4.4 s away from the stimulus onset (the third and fourth volumes of one
trial) to account for the delay of hemodynamic response function. Furthermore, the PSCs
in each voxel were normalized across triplets to have mean 0, and variance 1, to equate
variations in different voxels (Pereira, et al., 2009).
Feature Selection. To reduce the size of the data, relevant features were extracted
by using voxels with the most consistent responses toward different conditions across
cross-validation folds (Pereira, et al., 2009). Response stability was computed by
averaging pairwise correlation coefficients between vectors of repetitions of all
exemplars (Shinkareva, et al., 2011). The voxels with lowest response stability were
removed. The rationale of stability-based feature selection was that if a voxel responded
unsystematically between repetitions across conditions, it was unlikely to contain
information that is associated with different conditions. This procedure was based on
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training data only to avoid over-fitting. We explored different numbers of voxels retained
by feature selection instead of deciding upon an arbitrary threshold.
Classification within participants. A logistic regression classifier was used for
abstract vs. concrete two-way classification. As a commonly used classifier, logistic
regression directly estimates its parameters from the training data (Bishop, 2006). This
classifier was chosen because it is simple, less likely to generate overfitting compared to
non-linear classifiers, and has been successfully applied in previous studies (Mitchell et
al., 2004; Pereira, et al., 2009). To ensure the evaluation of classification performance
was unbiased, classification accuracy was evaluated using six-fold cross validation
procedure, where each fold corresponded to one repetition of all exemplars. The
repetitions were separated by the long fixation period, thus the independence between
training and test sets was ensured.
In each cross-validation fold, the trained classifiers were applied to each trial in
the test set to classify it as abstract or concrete. The accuracy was the proportion of trials
that were correctly classified. For each participant, the obtained accuracy was compared
to an empirically generated null distribution, formed by 1000 classification accuracies
obtained from the same dataset, but with randomly permuted labels.
In addition, the multinomial logistic regression classifiers were also trained to
identify each of the 16 exemplars. For simplicity, the number of voxels from a feature
selection step in this analysis was set to 400. The rest of the procedures of feature
selection, cross-validation, and significance test were the same as in the main two-way
classification.
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Region of interest (ROI) analysis. To investigate how the discriminating
information is distributed in the brain, the classifiers were trained on data from one of the
90 anatomically defined regions at a time (Shinkareva, Malave, Just, & Mitchell, 2012).
ROIs were defined by the automated anatomical labeling (AAL; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al.,
2002). Mean PSC in all gray matter voxels in each ROI was used to train the logistic
regression classifiers. To access if an anatomical region contained sufficient information
to decode abstract or concrete concepts on average across participants, the classification
accuracy for each region was compared to a binomial distribution B(n, p), where n was
the number of triples, and p is the probability of successfully identifying a triple as
abstract or concrete under the hypothesis that triples are randomly assigned into the two
categories (Pereira, et al., 2009). P-values (computed using a normal approximation)
were obtained for the mean classification accuracy, computed across participants for each
region. The p-values were compared to significance level at p = .05, corrected for
multiple comparisons.
Classification across participants. To test for a commonality in the neural
representation of abstract and concrete concepts across individuals, classifiers were
trained on data from all but one participant to identify trials as abstract or concrete in the
left-out participant. An entropy-based feature selection was applied to retain the voxels
containing most stable information across individuals. For each voxel, the Shannon
entropy was computed from the data of twelve individuals in the training set ordered by
individual exemplars within abstract and concrete categories. Entropy-based feature
selection has been validated as an efficient index of the voxel sensitivity toward the
variation of conditions (Poldrack, Halchenko, & Hanson, 2009). For simplicity, the top
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20% of most stable voxels, i.e., voxels with the lowest entropy values, were selected. For
each cross-validation fold, the classifier was trained on the PSC data from all but one
participant, which was the test dataset. This procedure was repeated for all participants.
Classification accuracy was compared to the empirically generated distribution, formed
by 1000 classification accuracies obtained from the same dataset, but with randomly
permuted labels. Accuracies with p-values smaller than .05 were considered significant.
3.3.

Results

3.3.1. Behavioral results
There were no significant differences in the mean reaction times across
participants between judgments on abstract and concrete triplets (MAbstract = 1.66 and
MConcrete = 1.69, t(12) = -0.85, p = .41). Moreover, none of the individual participant
showed significantly different reaction times between abstract and concrete triplets (p
ranged from .08 to .94). These results suggest making judgments on abstract or concrete
triplets did not differ in difficulty.
3.3.2. Within-participant classification based on the whole brain
When classifiers were trained to identify word triplets as abstract or concrete, the
mean accuracies across participants were significantly greater than chance (p ≤ .05) for
all threshold levels (Figure 3.1). Classification accuracies for one participant were as high
as 90.62% (87 out of 96 triplets correctly identified as abstract or concrete). The
classification accuracies were highest when the numbers of voxels used for classification
ranged from 50 to 3000. The accuracies were reliably above chance for most participants
even when all the voxels were included in the analysis.
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Figure 3.1
Within-participant classification accuracies for identifying trials as
abstract or concrete, summarized across 13 participants by box plots, are shown as a
function of different number of voxels. © 2013 Human Brain Mapping

The locations of voxels with largest classifier weights for identifying trial as
abstract or concrete were distributed in multiple areas in the brain (Figure 3.2). When
feature selection retained 400 voxels, the most informative voxels for identifying abstract
concepts that were consistently identified across participants were located in the left
inferior frontal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus, and posterior cingulate cortex; the most
consistent informative voxels for identifying concrete concepts were located in the left
angular gyrus, fusiform gyrus, inferior temporal gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, posterior
cingulate cortex, and precuneus.
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(Figure continued)

Figure 3.2
Consistency of informative voxels across participants. The most
informative voxels for decoding abstract vs. concrete concepts representation within
participants were shown on a surface rendering at three feature selection thresholds:
retaining 400, 1000, or 3000 voxels. Participants were ordered by within-participant
classification accuracy. The warm color indicates the top 5% of voxels that were most
informative for identifying abstract trials. The cool color indicates the top 5% of voxels
that were most informative for identifying concrete trials. The last row displayed the
thresholded probability maps (p = 0.05, FWE corrected) of the informative voxels that
were consistently identified across all 13 participants.
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In addition, classifiers were trained to identify which specific exemplar a participant was
making similarity judgments on. Classification reached mean accuracy of 14.4% across
participants for classifying an exemplar into one of the 16 categories (compared to 9.38%
at p = 0.05 level of significance). Exemplars were reliably (p ≤ .05) identified for 11 out
of 13 participants. Most of the mistakes that the classifier was making were within the
same abstract or concrete category (Figure 3.3). Thus, the mental states associated with
making similarity judgments with either abstract or concrete concepts can be decoded on
a single trial basis, suggesting the distinct representations of abstract and concrete
concepts.
3.3.3. Within-participant classification based on single ROIs
To investigate whether individual regions contain sufficient information for
decoding abstract and concrete concepts, classifiers were trained using voxels from only
one anatomical region at a time. Fifty-two out of the 90 ROIs showed reliable (p ≤ .05)
classification accuracies on average, across participants. These regions were distributed
across temporal, frontal, parietal and occipital lobes bilaterally, while the regions with the
highest accuracies were mostly in the left hemisphere (Figure 3.4). Out of the 52
informative ROIs, 30 were in the left hemisphere, including the top 15 ROIs with highest
average accuracies across participants. The left homologues of all the informative righthemisphere ROIs also contained information for successful identification. Among these
bilateral region pairs, the average classification accuracies across participants were higher
in the left hemisphere, with an exception of the lingual gyrus. Five ROIs, including left
middle temporal gyrus, left precuneus, left angular gyrus, left middle occipital gyrus and
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Figure 3.3
Exemplar classification confusion matrix averaged across participants.
The value of each element indicates the proportion of exemplars identified as the
corresponding label. © 2013 Human Brain Mapping
left precentral gyrus, showed significant accuracy for all of the participants (Figure 3.5).
These results were highly comparable to the location of the informative voxels
weighted by the classifier (Figure 3.2). Thus abstract vs. concrete processing can be
successfully decoded from multiple single brain regions.
3.3.4. Across-participant classification based on the whole brain
Classifiers were trained on data from 12 participants to determine if it was
possible to identify individual trials as abstract or concrete in the left-out participant. The
average accuracy across participants of identifying triples as abstract or concrete when
the classifier was trained on data from other participants was 84.13% (p ≤ .001). Word
triples for all 13 participants were reliably (p ≤ .05) identified, with the accuracies
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Figure 3.4
Mean classification accuracies across participants, for trial identification
as abstract or concrete, are shown for each anatomically defined ROI. Regions with
significant mean accuracy across participants (p = .05) are shown on a brain template.
© 2013 Human Brain Mapping
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Figure 3.5
Classification accuracies for identification of trials as abstract or concrete
are shown for each ROI and each participant. Significant accuracies (p = .05) are shown
in color. © 2013 Human Brain Mapping
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ranging from 62.50% to 93.75% (Figure 3.6). This result indicates the commonality of
abstract vs. concrete representation across individuals.
3.4.

Discussion

We were able to successfully identify brain activity patterns as abstract or
concrete based on single trial data. This study has extended previous results on concrete
words representation to abstract concepts. Compared with studies that examined
activation differences in abstract and concrete concept representation, this study suggests
participants’ mental states during processing of abstract and concrete semantic concepts
were identifiable from distributed patterns of activity on an individual trial basis.
Moreover, whether a participant was making similarity judgments on abstract or
concrete concepts was identifiable solely based on data from other participants, in spite of
the anatomical and functional variability across individual brains (Fedorenko &
Kanwisher, 2009). It supports the cross-individual principles of processing semantic
concept. Classification of mental states across individuals has been previously shown for
visually depicted objects (Shinkareva, et al., 2008), concrete nouns referring to physical
objects (Just, et al., 2010; Shinkareva, et al., 2011), lie detection (Davatzikos et al., 2005),
attentional tasks (Mourao-Miranda, Bokde, Born, Hampel, & Stetter, 2005), cognitive
tasks (Poldrack, et al., 2009), and voxel-by-voxel correspondence across individuals has
been demonstrated during movie-watching (Hasson, Nir, Levy, Fuhrmann, & Malach,
2004). The current study for the first time demonstrates the ability to identify the mental
states of a participant as processing abstract or concrete concepts based on neural
activation data from other participants.
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Figure 3.6
High across-participants classification accuracies for identifying single
trials as abstract or concrete based on data from other participants. Dashed line indicates
p = .05 level of significance. © 2013 Human Brain Mapping

Classification within individual anatomically defined regions showed that activity
patterns in even single regions were sufficient for identifying trials as abstract or concrete.
The present results of regions with discriminating information show considerable overlap
with the meta-analysis results based on previous statistical parametric mapping studies
locating the differences of abstract vs. concrete semantic concept representation (Binder,
et al., 2009; Wang, Conder, Blitzer, & Shinkareva, 2010). Most regions that were
previously identified by the meta-analysis were also found to contain information
sufficient for identification of trials as abstract or concrete in the current study (Table 2.2;
Figure 3.4). The top six ROIs with the highest average accuracy were also identified by
the meta-analyses results. However, this single study identified more informative areas
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compared to the combined results of early lesion studies and neuroimaging. In fact, the
current results are more comparable to the collection of previous univariate results
(Figure 2.1). The extensive spatial distribution of discriminating information may reflect
the lack of semantic context restriction during single word processing. Compared to the
word specified in a meaningful sentence, single word processing in a semantics-related
task may stimulate the rich contexts of the word more extensively (Price 2010).
Although the left ATL is one of the areas that consistently show activational
differences for abstract > concrete concept processing, activity patterns in the temporal
pole only result in chance-level accuracies for identifying the two conditions.
Considering the ATL has been associated with a number of functions related to
knowledge representation (Simmons & Martin, 2009), we attribute the lack of
information for the temporal pole in Chapter 3 to the low signal-to-noise ratio of fMRI
measures at this area due to the susceptibility artifacts (Devlin, et al., 2000; Lipschutz, et
al., 2001). A possible solution is adjusting MRI acquisition parameters to reduce signal
loss.
The left hemisphere was engaged in the abstract vs. concrete concept
identification to a very large extent. Thirty out of the 45 left hemisphere ROIs showed
significant accuracies on average across participants. A number of right hemisphere
regions also held information of abstract vs. concrete differentiation. Previous studies
have found the activation differences in some of these right hemisphere regions, but with
low cross-study consistency (Binder, et al., 2005; D'Esposito, et al., 1997; Fliessbach, et
al., 2006; Grossman, et al., 2002; Harris et al., 2006; Jessen, et al., 2000; Mellet, et al.,
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1998; Perani, et al., 1999; Sabsevitz, et al., 2005; Tettamanti, et al., 2008; Wallentin, et
al., 2005; Whatmough, et al., 2004).
The extensive spatial distribution of discriminating information may reflect the
lack of semantic context restriction during single word processing. Compared to the word
specified in a meaningful sentence, single word processing in a semantics-related task
may stimulate the rich contexts of the word more extensively (Price 2010). Even though,
this is the first time that such a large number of informative brain areas for abstract vs.
concrete concept representation were identified in a single experiment. It is quite striking
that single regions contain, on their own, enough information to decode the presented
concepts. It is likely to be the case that sufficient information for category identification
is represented in several different regions, lending a somewhat different interpretation to
the notion of a distributed representation. Different areas may contribute to differences in
abstract vs. concrete representation in various ways, for example in terms of the richness
of semantic context, coding system, retrieval strategy, or working memory. A number of
regions identified in the current study have been shown in previous studies using
statistical parametric mapping, but not in the same experiment, with a limited number of
stimuli in a single task. One of the reasons, based on the current results, may be the lack
of sensitivity in detecting the differences. These results suggest that the representation of
abstract and concrete concepts were differentiated on various aspects rather than a single
mechanism. Further studies may help illuminate the representational content in regions
that support category identification across stimulus formats, such as studies using itemrepetition priming (Grill-Spector, Kushnir, Edelman, Avidan, & Itzchak, 1999; James,
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Humphrey, Gati, Menon, & Goodale, 2002; Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver, & Dolan, 2002)
or Dynamically Adaptive Imaging (Cusack, Veldsman, Naci, Mitchell, & Linke, 2012).
3.5.

Conclusion

By using multi-voxel pattern analysis, this study successfully identified brain
activity patterns as abstract or concrete based on single trial data, suggesting participants’
mental states during processing of abstract and concrete semantic concepts were
identifiable from distributed patterns of activity on an individual trial basis. The ability to
identify whether a participant was representing abstract or concrete concepts solely from
other participants’ data suggests the cross-individual principles of organizing this type of
knowledge are similar.
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Chapter 4
Using functional connectivity patterns to identify abstract and concrete
concept representations
4.1.

Pattern classification beyond localized information

4.1.1. Context availability hypothesis and functional connectivity
Semantic memory relies on anatomically widespread and functionally complex
neural components with high interactivity (Binder, et al., 2009; Bookheimer, 2002). The
review and experiments in the previous sections have clearly indicated that categoryspecific information is represented in a more distributed pattern than previously thought.
Specifically, the successful multivoxel classification on a whole brain level suggests that
co-activation patterns across various brain regions carry information that distinguishes
between the abstract and concrete categories. Do the patterns of interaction among
regions differ for processing abstract and concrete concepts? From a theoretical
perspective, this question pertains to some aspects in the context-availability hypothesis
that remain unanswered by the previous studies. Both the univoxel and multivoxel studies
have strongly suggested the recruitment of modality-specific, visual sensory and imagery
systems in processing concrete concepts, supporting the hypothesis that the
representation of concrete concepts can resort to the additional modality-specific systems.
By contrast, the context availability hypothesis has been examined in indirect and limited
ways, partly due to its focus on the extensiveness of semantic associations instead of
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identifying separate processing systems. The findings that verbal semantic system is
involved in the processing of abstract and concrete concepts to different extents do not
directly inform about the variety or density of the associated semantic content. To address
these questions, a method that directly measures the intercorrelation among brain regions
for different conditions is more suitable than the approach that investigates the
information localized in segregated spatial units. The presumptions for mapping contextavailability theory onto the spatial correlation between brain regions are the modularity of
brain function, and the distribution of brain regions involved in semantic processing. The
structure or pattern of the semantic association is assumed to be reflected in the patterns
of connectivity among brain regions, even though the units of observation, namely voxel
and between-voxel correlation, do not represent the node or link in the hypothetical
semantic space. The current work aimed to test the context-availability hypotheses by
examining whether the patterns of functional connectivity associated with processing
abstract concepts are different from the patterns associated with concrete concepts.
We translated the context-availability hypothesis to functional connectivity
language from two perspectives. First, the hypothesis of retrieval difficulty predicts
different patterns of functional connectivity of the semantic executive functioning area
with other regions for processing abstract and concrete concepts. We assumed the
difference of intrinsic difficulty between the two categories of concepts was associated
with different retrieval strategies and efforts. The connectivity between the semantic
executive functioning area and other systems involved was expected to reflect such
category-specific differences. Based on rationale discussed in the previous chapters, we
considered the left inferior frontal gyrus as the semantic executive functioning area.
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Second, the hypothesis of contextual constraints predicts difference in the large-scale
connectivity across multiple regions involved in the semantic processing. Abstract
concepts were considered having greater variety or looser constraints on semantic
contexts, therefore we expected the patterns of whole-brain voxelwise connectivity for
processing abstract and concrete concepts to be different. In addition, we also
investigated the voxelwise connectivity patterns within the left middle temporal gyrus
and angular gyrus, which were considered supramodal semantic areas based on a
comprehensive quantitative review on semantic memory (Binder, et al., 2009).
4.1.2. Classification based on patterns of condition-specific connectivity
Functional connectivity in the brain refers to the temporal correlations in neural
activity among distinct brain regions (Friston, 1994). Although the majority of
applications of functional connectivity to resting-state network in the brain, some studies
have illustrated possible methods that allow the investigation of connectivity patterns
associated with experimental conditions (Dodel et al., 2005; Rissman, Gazzaley, &
D’Esposito, 2004). However the condition-specific differences were not statistically
evaluated in these studies, likely due to the lack of sensitivity of univariate tests. The
present study used the MVPA framework to test whether the condition-specific
connectivity patterns learned from a group of individuals can be applied to identify the
condition of data from a new individual. The temporal resolution of fMRI measures
limits the examination of connectivity differences within individuals, whereas the crossindividual classification allows investigating the condition-specific differences for each
individual based on the data of others. We used the same experimental paradigm as in
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Chapter 3, with twelve additional participants to reach a sample size of 25 for crossindividual classification.
Previous studies have applied MVPA approach to classify connectivity-based
fMRI data for different mental states, such as movie watching vs. resting (Richiardi,
Eryilmaz, Schwartz, Vuilleumier, & Van De Ville, 2011), or tasks associated with
episodic memory, music lyrics, and mathematical operation (Shirer, Ryali, Rykhlevskaia,
Menon, & Greicius, 2012). These studies were able to use relatively small numbers (≤
100) of nodes on a whole-brain level to identify fundamentally different cognitive states.
The present study aimed to detect the comparatively subtle differences in categoryspecific semantic processing. Therefore, we investigated the voxel-by-voxel connectivity
patterns both at a whole-brain level and with pre-defined regions of interests. The
rationale of the procedure is that if connectivity patterns are different for the
representations of abstract and concrete concepts, and such differences are consistent
across individuals, we should be able to identify whether an individual is processing an
abstract or a concrete concept based on the connectivity patterns from other individuals.
4.2.

Methods

4.2.1. Participants
Twenty-five participants (thirteen female) from the University of South Carolina
community participated in this experiment and gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Institutional Review Board at the University of South Carolina.
Participants were right-handed, healthy adults and native English-speakers. Thirteen of
these participants were included in the study reported in Chapter 3.
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4.2.2 – 4.2.4
See section 3.2.2 – 3.2.4 for Materials, Procedure and MRI Acquisition.
4.2.5. FMRI data preprocessing
The data were processed using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Images for
each participant were corrected for head movement by aligning images to the first
volume based on a six-parameter rigid body transformation. The linear trend in images
for each participant was then removed to correct the signal intensity drift. The images
were normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute template and re-sampled to the voxel
size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 for examining the connectivity within the general semantic systems,
or re-sampled to 10 × 10 × 10 mm3 voxels for computing the whole-brain connectivity
matrix and connectivity seeded in the left IFG.
4.2.6. Preliminary test: SPM on seed-based connectivity
We first examined if the condition-specific difference of the connectivity to the
left IFG could be located in any region. This approach was analogous to the univoxel
SPM approach on the activity maps. We first examined whether the connectivity of any
voxel to the seed region showed significant response to the abstract or concrete condition.
The correlation maps at the resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 voxel for the seed region with the
other voxels for abstract and concrete conditions were converted to the z-maps by
Fisher’s Z transformation. Random-effect group level analyses were performed on the zmaps for each condition respectively (Rissman, et al., 2004).
4.2.7. Connectivity-based MVPA
The cross-participant MVPA was performed on three types of connectivity
matrices as indicated by the hypotheses: the whole-brain voxel-by-voxel connectivity, the
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connectivity between the seed of left IFG and other voxels in the brain, and the voxel-byvoxel connectivity within the semantic areas. The regions of interests were defined by the
anatomical masks from Anatomical Automatic Labeling (Tzourio-Mazoyer, et al., 2002).
The measurement of connectivity was the Pearson correlation coefficient of weighted
time series between pairs of regions. The condition-specific weight was estimated by
convolving the vector of onsets for abstract or concrete condition with the canonical
hemodynamic response function. To ensure the real-valued correlation all the values in
the weight vector are made positive by taking the absolute value (Dodel, et al., 2005).
Preprocessed time series were weighted for each condition to generate two correlation
matrices that represented the connectivity patterns for abstract and concrete conditions.
The pattern classification procedure was performed to test the cross-individual
consistencies of the patterns for abstract and concrete conditions. A similarity-based
classifier was trained on data from all but one participant, to identify the test data, i.e.
connectivity matrices for the left out participant. This procedure was implemented
iteratively, leaving out each of the participants once. Classifications were performed
either on all the unique connections in the matrix or with feature selection. To select
connections that responded to the experimental conditions, matrices in the training set
were first transformed to Fisher’s Z score. One sample t-tests against the null hypothesis
of no response were then performed for each connection across all the participants in the
training set, for abstract and concrete matrix respectively. The connections with the
highest t values in either condition were selected jointly for both conditions, so that the
feature selection was orthogonal to the classification categories. Because there is no one
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preferred way to choose the threshold, we have studied abstract and concrete conditionspecific matrices at multiple threshold levels.
For the training set, weighted average matrices for abstract and concrete
conditions were generated by weighting each participant’s matrix by how similar they
were to each other (Abdi, Dunlop, & Williams, 2009; Shinkareva, et al., 2011;
Shinkareva, Ombao, Sutton, Mohanty, & Miller, 2006). Pairwise similarity between
participants was measured by the RV coefficient (Robert & Escoufier, 1976), a
multivariate generalization of the Pearson correlation coefficient to matrices. Each
participant’s data were weighted by the first eigenvector of the similarity matrix which
was scaled to sum up to one.
For each test matrix, the cosine similarity scores with abstract and concrete
training matrices was computed, and the test matrix was labeled according to the training
condition with the higher similarity score (Mitchell, et al., 2008). Classification was
evaluated based on whether the hit score was higher than the miss score across the two
conditions. The overall classification accuracies were averaged across participants.
To determine the significance of classification accuracy, the distribution of
accuracies under the null hypothesis of no condition-specific distinction was empirically
generated. This distribution was formed by 1000 accuracies obtained from the same
dataset and procedure, except that the elements in training matrices were randomly
reordered in each of the 1000 iterations.
4.3.

Results

4.3.1. Seed-based connectivity: SPM
Before testing the hypotheses by using MVPA, we localized the condition-
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specific connectivity differences for the left IFG. First, regions that were significantly
connected to the left IFG in the two conditions across participants were found to be
considerably overlapping (Figure 4.1).
We then tested condition-specific difference on the connectivity maps. The
difference z-maps were obtained respectively for concrete > abstract and abstract >
concrete comparisons. The comparisons between the two conditions did not reveal any
voxel whose connectivity to the seed region showed significant difference, even at a
liberal threshold of uncorrected p ≤ .001, cluster size = 2 voxels. Nevertheless, the maps
of the t tests implicated several regions with a trend of condition-specific connectivity
strengths to the seed. Compared to abstract concepts, concrete concepts tended to elicit
greater connectivity to the seed IFG region in the bilateral inferior temporal gyrus, from
the posterior lateral to the medial anterior portion. The bilateral angular gyrus also
appeared to show stronger connectivity to the seed region for concrete concepts. The left
medial superior frontal gyrus, a lower portion of the left postcentral gyrus, the right
lateral globus pallidus, a cluster at the posterior cingulate cortex and retrosplenial region,
and the anterior prefrontal cortex also tended to associate with the seed region to a greater
extent for concrete concepts (Figure 4.2). In contrast, the regions showing a tendency of
stronger connectivity to the seed region for processing abstract concepts included a
stream from the supramarginal gyrus down to the pSTS and the relatively medial section
of middle temporal gyrus, a cluster around the lower portion of the precentral gyrus, and
the middle occipital gyrus. The cross-individual commonality of connections that
responded to both of the conditions and the trend of univariate differences between
conditions suggested that the connectivity-based MVPA was promising to identify
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condition-specific connectivity patterns.

Figure 4.1
Voxels with significant (FWE corrected, p ≤ .05, cluster size = 5)
connectivity to the left IFG for concrete (red) and abstract (blue) concept processing;
spatial resolution at 3 × 3 × 3 mm3. The overlapped voxels of the two conditions are
shown in magenta.

Figure 4.2
The map of t-values for contrast concrete > abstract (hot) and abstract >
concrete (cold) on MNI template of multiple slices and a rendered brain surface.
88

4.3.2. Classification on connectivity between the left IFG with other regions
We were able to identify abstract or concrete concepts associated with
connectivity patterns of the left IFG with other brain areas with accuracies that were
significantly above chance at multiple threshold levels (Table 4.1). The classification
accuracy based on all the connections in the brain was 72%. Using the connections that
significantly responded to either condition (FWE corrected) increased the classification
performance to an accuracy of 80%. To investigate the connections that were included in
the thresholded connectivity maps, the same one-sample t-tests used for feature selection
were performed on all the participants and thresholded at p of .05 (FWE corrected). First,
the selected voxels were distributed in multiple regions (Figure 4.3), comparable to the
results of the analyses performed on the resolution of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 (i.e., Figure 4.1).
Second, the voxels selected by the data from abstract and the concrete conditions also
largely overlapped. These findings indicated that (1) the selections of voxels by the
feature selection for classification were not dominated by either of the two conditions,
and (2) the selected voxels were not discriminative to the conditions at univoxel level. In
other words, the successful classifications were unlikely to be driven by the bias in voxel
selection or the univariate differences.
4.3.3. Classification on voxel-by-voxel connectivity
The whole-brain group mask for the current experiment consisted of 1509 voxels
common to all 25 participants. Classification based on the whole-brain connectivity
patterns with no further feature selection resulted in 84% accuracy. The above-chance
classification accuracies were stable at a range of numbers of connections (Table 4.2).
In addition, we investigated the voxel-by-voxel connectivity pattern at the voxel
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Table 4.1
Classification accuracies at multiple feature selection threshold levels
based on connectivity to the left IFG
Threshold of feature selection

1

.05, FWE corrected

.1

.05

Accuracy

0.72*

0.8*

0.84*

0.72*

Averaged number of connections

1401

484.48

212

112.16

*: p ≤ .05.

Table 4.2
Classification accuracies at multiple feature selection threshold levels
based on whole-brain voxel-by-voxel connectivity.
Threshold of feature selection

1

0.05

0.01

0.001

Accuracy

0.84*

0.92*

0.72*

0.56

Averaged number of connections

2277081

179144.40

39122.80

5447.68

*: p ≤ .05.

Figure 4.3
Voxels with significant (FWE corrected, p ≤ .05) connectivity to the left
IFG in concrete (red) and abstract (blue) concept processing; spatial resolution at 10 × 10
× 10 mm3. The overlapped voxels of the two conditions are shown in magenta.
size of 3 × 3 × 3 mm3 within the left MTG and angular gyrus. Classification accuracies
were significant when feature selection was used (Table 4.3).
4.4.

Discussion

The present study examined the cross-individual consistencies of the connectivity
patterns for abstract and concrete concept representations based on fMRI data.
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Table 4.3
Classification accuracies at multiple feature selection threshold levels
based on voxel-by-voxel connectivity in the left MTG and angular gyrus.
Threshold of feature
selection

1

0.05

0.002

0.001

0.0001 0.00001

Accuracy

0.56

0.64*

0.68*

0.76*

0.52

Averaged number of

1615503 10382.44

0.6

4066.68 2093.28 253.24 26.32

connections
*: p ≤ .05.
The findings indicated systematic differences in functional connectivity between abstract
and concrete conditions. The commonality across participants in the connectivity patterns
elicited by abstract and concrete words enabled the cross-participant classification.
Context-availability theory attempted to interpret the representational difference
between abstract and concrete concepts by the difference in a single mechanism.
Although it has been shown that the modality-specific systems are involved in categoryspecific concepts to different degrees, these findings have not ruled out the possibility of
predictions about the context-availability. The current evidence was consistent with the
hypothesis that the representation of abstract and concrete concepts also differs from the
semantic association perspective. First, the successful classification on seed-based
connectivity indicated that the property of retrieved information or retrieval strategy for
processing abstract and concrete concepts were different, even though the regions
involved were considerably overlapping. Although the seed-based SPM test did not
reveal any statistically meaningful difference between abstract and concrete concepts, the
clustering of voxels with a difference between conditions suggested the possibility for the
connectivity of those regions to the left IFG to be condition-specific. Consistent with the
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findings of locating activational differences, the inferior temporal gyrus was found to be
more involved in the processing of concrete concepts whilst the middle temporal gyrus
was found to engage more in the processing of abstract concepts. The results also
suggested that various regions in the temporal-parietal junction area were involved in
conceptual representation in different ways, with the posterior area being involved more
in processing concrete concepts and the anterior area in abstract concepts. Similarly, the
anterior temporal lobe, particularly the medial section, presented complex patterns for
representing the two categories of concepts. In addition, condition-specific differences
appeared to present at the lateral area in the posterior and medial area in the anterior
section in the temporal lobe. The overall patterns of connectivity suggested that the
retrieval of knowledge about concrete concepts was more localized in several regions,
whereas retrieving abstract concepts was associated with a more distributed network.
Second, the patterns of intercorrelations among regions involved in semantic
processing showed category-specific differences. The successful classification based on
all the voxels in the brain indicated such differences were represented in widespread
areas. Future study is required to characterize the differences in connectivity patters by
using network analyses approaches. The unstable performance of identifying connectivity
patterns of the supramodal semantic areas as abstract or concrete could be attributed to
several factors, including the lack of distinguishable patterns between the two conditions,
the lack of cross-individual consistency, and the vulnerability to noise at relatively
smaller voxel size. It is possible that the functional organization represented by the
connectivity was different from that by the activation-based results. Hence model-free
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network extraction methods would be useful to explore the functional structure for further
investigation.
4.5.

Conclusion

The condition-specific connectivity patterns across the whole-brain were
distinguishable between abstract and concrete concept representations, and these
differences were consistent across participants. Our findings provided supporting
evidence for two aspects of the context-availability theory that accounted for the
representational difference between abstract and concrete concepts, namely the
differences of retrieval difficulty and strategy, and the differences of semantic contextual
constraints.
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Chapter 5
The role of general semantic systems in the representation of person-specific
knowledge: An application of cross-modal MVPA
5.1.

Introduction

In research of semantic knowledge representation in the brain, one long-standing
question is whether common neural responses exit between different stimuli presentation
formats of the same concept. For instance, processing pictures of animate vs. inanimate
objects results in systematically different brain activities, and reading words referring to
these two categories of objects also causes a difference in brain activities, how do we test
whether the differences are dependent of presentation format, or due to supramodal
representations? Such questions are highly compatible with MVPA’s framework of
prediction, and can be translated to MVPA languages, such as, “given that the response
patterns of animate vs. inanimate object processing are identifiable in picture or words, is
it possible to predict which categories of words the participant is reading based on data of
viewing pictures?” Accurate classifications will suggest a commonality of distinguishable
animate vs. inanimate representations between words and pictures. A recently study used
this method to verify the identifiable common neural states across pictorial and verbal
stimuli of tools and dwellings by successful classification in both directions (Shinkareva,
et al., 2011).
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This cross-format prediction approach, characterized by using heterogeneous data
for training and test sets, is a useful tool to demonstrate the representational commonality
across formats or modalities of stimuli. The current experiment aimed to illustrate the
application of this approach on examining the role of general semantic system on personspecific knowledge.
The biographical knowledge about familiar people is a significant component of
semantic memories and plays important roles in various aspects of life.
Neuropsychological cases of semantic deficits on person-specific knowledge suggest the
possibility that such information is represented separately from other domains of
knowledge (Ellis, Young, & Critchley, 1989; Evans, Heggs, Antoun, & Hodges, 1995;
Thompson et al., 2004). The reports of cases with relatively preserved person-specific
knowledge in the context of impaired general semantics further suggest a dissociation of
person-specific and general semantic memory (Lyons, Kay, Hanley, & Haslam, 2006;
Thompson, et al., 2004). However, this hypothesis is subject to questionings at multiple
levels. First, certain confounders may exist in the tasks used for person-specific vs.
general semantics and the stimuli per se in these studies, such as the strength of semantic
association among stimuli within the same condition (e.g., the overall semantic distance
for a stimulus pool with names of musicians and politicians can be different from that for
a stimulus pool with animals and artifacts), the salience of the given property to the
object in property verification tasks (e.g., the function as to objects can be of different
importance from the occupation as to people), the semantic density of each stimulus, etc.
The activity of regions for processing person-specific information has been found to
relate to the amount of knowledge associated with the concept (Desai, Tadimeti, &
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Binder, 2012), suggesting the possible alternative interpretation of the role for these areas.
Second, the localization of neural substrates for person-specific knowledge has revealed
discrepancies in both neuropsychological and functional imaging literatures (Ellis, et al.,
1989; Gorno-Tempini et al., 1998; Hodges & Graham, 1998; Leveroni et al., 2000;
Miceli et al., 2000). It is noteworthy that the reported areas have considerable overlap
with the neural circuits for general semantic memory, such as ATL, pSTS/MTG, the
precuneus, etc. (e.g., Desai, et al., 2012; Gorno-Tempini, et al., 1998; Leveroni, et al.,
2000). Third, the impairments of person-related knowledge in some reported cases cooccurred with impaired knowledge of other domains, such as living things (Hanley,
Young, & Pearson, 1989) or concepts with high uniqueness, such as geographical shape
or famous products and buildings (Ellis, et al., 1989; Saetti, Marangolo, De Renzi,
Rinaldi, & Lattanzi, 1999). These findings are compatible with the argument that deficits
on person-specific knowledge essentially reflect impaired general semantic memory
system, to which the knowledge with low semantic density, or high uniqueness, is more
vulnerable.
We hypothesized that the representation of person-specific knowledge partly
relied on the general semantic system. The current study examined whether the
multivoxel activations in the brain areas that were associated with semantic memory
showed distinguishable patterns for processing familiar vs. unfamiliar items on a single
trial basis. Furthermore, we used a cross-modal MVPA to examine whether the activity
patterns associated with general semantic processing can be applied to identify the
processing of familiarity.
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5.2.

Methods

5.2.1. Participants
Five right-handed, native English-speakers with no history of neurological illness
participated in this study. Written informed consents were obtained from the participants
prior to the experiment in accordance with the protocol sanctioned from Medical College
of Wisconsin and Marquette University Institutional Review Boards.
5.2.2. Materials
The stimuli for the semantic task were 100 real words and 100 pseudowords
matched on various low-level properties. The real words condition contained 50 abstract
words and 50 concrete words. These three categories of stimulus (concrete, abstract and
pseudowords) were matched on letter length, phoneme length, mean positional bigram
frequency (MPBF) and orthographic neighborhood size using phonological data and
frequency counts from English Lexicon Project database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Van
Rijn, 1993; Balota et al., 2007).
The stimuli for the person-specific knowledge task included names of known
(famous or personally familiar) or unknown persons and places. Each category of stimuli
(famous person, famous places, personally familiar person, personally familiar places,
unfamiliar person, or unfamiliar places) consisted of 40 items. The famous people and
places list which was used for all subjects was constructed such that most items were
familiar to the subjects. The personally familiar people and places list was provided by
the subjects a few days before the experiment. The unknown people and places were
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which were also common for all the subjects were collected from the telephone directory
and the web and were verified using ratings.
5.2.3. Procedures
While being scanned, participants were instructed to make lexical decisions on
words or pseudowords in the semantic task, and to make familiarity judgments on names
of items in the person-specific knowledge task. Both tasks were implemented in eventrelated design, with each item presented for 1 s in pseudo-random order with jittered
intervals of 2.5 - 12 seconds. Each of the tasks consisted of 4 imaging runs.
5.2.4. MRI acquisition
MR images were acquired on a 3T long bore scanner (GE Medical Systems,
Milwaukee, WI). Functional data consisted of gradient echo planar images, with TR =
2500 ms, TE = 20 ms, voxel size = 1.5 × 1.5 × 2 mm3. Structural T1 weighted images
were collected using a spoiled gradient-echo sequence , with TR = 8.2 ms TE = 3.2 ms,
flip angle = 12°, FOV = 240 mm, 256 × 224 matrix, slice thickness = 1 mm. Images were
collected with oblique partial brain acquisition, which covered the temporal lobe, inferior
frontal and the supramarginal gyri in 34 slices.
5.2.5. FMRI data preprocessing
The AFNI software package (Cox, 1996) was used for image analysis. Images
were despiked by replacing the extreme value in a voxel based on those of its neighbors
using interpolation. Motion artifacts were minimized by with-in-participant registration
of echo planar image volumes. Estimates of the three translation and three rotation
movements at each point in each time-series were computed during registration. The
mean signal in the ventricles, white matter areas and regions outside the brain were
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estimated to be included as covariates of noise in the general linear models along with the
head motion parameters. The mean and linear trends across time in each imaging runs
were removed on a voxel basis.
5.2.6. MVPA methods
Data extraction
The data for MVPA were the beta estimate of the general linear model for each of
the trials in a task at each voxel. Trials on which errors occurred were excluded from the
model. For each individual trial, event-related deconvolution analysis of the time-series
was used to estimate the hemodynamic response at each voxel. The head motion
parameters and noise parameters were included in the regression model as covariates.
The resulting maps for each participant were linearly resampled in standard stereotaxic
space to a voxel size of 1 × 1 × 1 mm3 and spatially smoothed with a 6 mm full-widthhalf-maximum Gaussian kernel to compensate for variance in anatomical structure.
Feature selection
Discriminative feature selections were used for both the within-modal and crossmodal classification. For the within-modal classifications (training and testing sets were
from the same task), to select voxels with different responses between conditions in each
task, two-sample t-tests were performed in a leave-one-trial-out cross-validation
procedure, so that the selected voxels were blind to the test set.
For the cross-modal classifications, we used the group level contrast map to select
voxels for each task. Event-related deconvolution analyses were used to estimate the
hemodynamic response to each condition, i.e. word and pseudoword for the semantic task,
and familiar and unfamiliar items for the person-specific knowledge task. The head
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motion parameters and noise parameters were included in the regression model as
covariates. Contrasts between conditions were then performed under the general linear
model for each task to identify the differences of response between conditions within
each voxel. The contrasts for the two tasks were word – pseudoword and familiar –
unfamiliar respectively. The resulting contrast maps for each participant were linearly
resampled in standard stereotaxic space to a voxel size of 1 × 1 × 1 mm3 and spatially
smoothed with a 6 mm full-width-half-maximum Gaussian kernel to compensate for
variance in anatomical structure. The normalized and smoothed maps were then subject
to a random effects analysis comparing the coefficient values to a null hypothesis mean
of zero across participants.
Voxels with highest absolute values of the contrast were selected for the training
and testing. We examined the classification performance on a range of numbers of voxels
to examine the reliability of classification.
Classification 1: Within- modal classification
The purpose of within-modal classifications was twofold. The first purpose is to
validate the MVPA procedure for decoding information content in this dataset for further
analyses. The second purpose is to test the hypothesis that regions included in the
semantic processing contained sufficient information to identify stimuli as being familiar
or unfamiliar. Within-modal classification was conducted to identify word vs.
pseudoword trials in the semantic task. Logistic regression classifiers were trained on all
but one trial per condition to identify the left-out one as being word or pseudoword.
Classification 2: Familiarity and semantic processing
Classifiers were trained on the beta estimate in the semantic task to identify the
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conditions of processing familiar and unfamiliar items in the person-specific knowledge
task within each participant, and vice versa. Logistic regression classifier was used within
each participant’s data. Classification accuracies were the average performance across all
the test trials.
Significance tests
The chance accuracy for the two-way classification was expected to be 50%. To
determine the significance of accuracy, the obtained classification accuracy was
compared to a binomial distribution B(n, p), where n was the number of triples, and p is
the probability of successfully identifying a triple as abstract or concrete under the
hypothesis that triples are randomly assigned into the two categories. P-values (computed
using a normal approximation) were obtained for the mean classification accuracy,
computed across participants for each region. The p-values were compared to
significance level at p = .05.
5.3.

Results

5.3.1. Within-modal classification
Within-modal classification was conducted to identify word vs. pseudoword trials
in the semantic task. We were able to identify individual trials as word or pseudoword
with above-chance accuracies for all of the participants by using a large range of numbers
of voxels. Using fewer or more voxels resulted in a steady decrease in the classification
performances for some participants (Figure 5.1).
We were also able to identify individual trials as being associated with familiar or
unfamiliar people or places for most of the participants with above-chance accuracies.
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Figure 5.1
Classification accuracies for identifying trials as word or pseudoword,
summarized across all the participants by box plots, are shown as a function of different
number of voxels.
The numbers of voxels included in successful classifications were in a smaller range
compared to that for identifying word vs. pseudoword (Figure 5.2).
5.3.2. Cross-modal prediction
To test the hypothesis that the activity patterns processing of person-specific
knowledge relies on the semantic system, classifiers were trained on semantic tasks and
tested on person-specific knowledge tasks, and vice versa. Classification accuracies were
significant for one or two out of five participants in both directions (Figure 5.3 and Figure
5.4). The mean accuracies suggested that training on semantic task and testing on personspecific knowledge task resulted in higher accuracy than training on person-specific
knowledge task and testing on semantic task.
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Figure 5.2
Classification accuracies for identifying trials as familiar or unfamiliar
items, summarized across all the participants by box plots, are shown as a function of
different number of voxels.

5.4.

Discussion and summary

The current study investigated the role of the general semantic systems in
representing person-specific knowledge. By using the activity patterns in the temporal
lobe, inferior frontal and the supramarginal gyri, we were able to distinguish not only
between word and non-word, but also between the names of people and places that were
familiar and unfamiliar to the participants. The successful identification of familiarity in
the brain regions associated with semantic memory indicated shared neural substrates for
processing person-specific knowledge and semantic knowledge. Moreover, this study
illustrated the application of MVPA as a cross-modal prediction approach by
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Figure 5.3
Classification accuracies for identifying trials as familiar or unfamiliar
items based on patterns distinguishing words and pseudowords are shown for each
participant as a function of different number of voxels. Each line represents a participant.

investigating the role of general semantic system on person-specific knowledge. Results
suggested the possibility that person-specific knowledge was represented partly using the
general semantic systems (see section 6.2.2 for discussion on further application of this
approach). On the other hand, the trend that training on semantic task and testing on
person-specific knowledge task resulted in a trend of higher accuracy than training on
person-specific knowledge task and testing on semantic task suggested that the
representation of person-specific knowledge also relied on unique activity patterns that
were not shared with the representation of semantic knowledge.
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Figure 5.4
Classification accuracies for identifying trials as word or pseudoword
based on patterns distinguishing familiar and unfamiliar items are shown for each
participant as a function of different number of voxels. Each line represents a participant.
It should be noted that the current experiment with rapid presentation was
designed for other purposes, which was not ideal for MVPA. The accuracies for word vs.
pseudoword identification were not as high as expected, suggesting the noisy feature of
this dataset. Future studies may use optimized slow event-related design to separate
signals from contiguous trials.
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Chapter 6
General discussion
6.1.

Summary and implications

The representation of semantic knowledge in the brain is an important aspect of
the cognitive functioning. Neuroimaging studies not only validate the hypotheses derived
from lesion studies, but also provide further information about the localization problem
and implications to the organizational principles of semantic knowledge in the brain. The
development of novel methods for analyzing fMRI data allows utilizing the rich
information to investigate a broad research question from various complementary
perspectives. This dissertation focused on two perspectives, namely the representational
difference between concrete and abstract concepts, and the application of multivariate
analyses to semantic processing in the brain. A joint examination at the results suggested
that when the processing difficulty was controlled, the concreteness of a concept affected
the neural mechanisms involved in the processing. These differences were presented on
multiple aspects. Different regions were activated to different degrees for the
representations of abstract and concrete concepts. Concrete concepts relied more on the
perceptual and imagery systems, whereas the processing of abstract concepts was more
demanding in retrieving relevant knowledge and discriminating among the competitor
and relied more on the supramodal verbal systems. Besides the activational differences
localized in specific regions, the category-specific effects were found in widely
distributed areas, in terms of both the activity patterns in segregated sites and the
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intercorrelations among regions. It is unlikely that the effects of concreteness can be
attributed to single isolated cognitive process.
6.1.1. Implications on the theories accounting for the concreteness effects
The work in this dissertation indicated that the original, strong versions of both
the dual coding and context availability theories are insufficient to account for the
concreteness effect. On the one hand, the selective involvement of posterior ventral
temporal area, the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex implicated that the
representation of concrete concepts drew on modality-specific, particularly visual
perceptual and imagery systems. On the other hand, the distinct patterns of inter-regional
correlations at a scale of whole brain suggested the associational contextual differences
for processing abstract and concrete concepts. Using the left IFG as the executive
functioning area for semantic processing, the distinguishable pattern of its connection to
other regions indicated that the online processing of abstract and concrete concepts also
differed in the way of how the semantic information was retrieved. In summary, the
results reported in this dissertation suggested that the representational differences
between abstract and concrete concepts occur at various levels: the dependence on
modality-specific perceptual systems, the organization of associations among different
semantic-related systems, and the difficulty and strategy of retrieving contextual
information.
6.1.2. Implications on the functional anatomy of semantic processing
The large body of literatures on the representation of object-related concepts has
provided crucial information of the roles of various brain areas in semantic processing.
Combining these findings with the current results suggested some trends of the perceptual
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to semantic representation of concepts (Figure 6.1). The anterior temporal lobe and the
left angular gyrus and surrounding areas, which were identified in the meta-analyses, are
located adjacent to, if not overlapping with, the areas that converge multimodal inputs
and represent supramodal conceptual knowledge about objects. Considered as two
supramodal centers, the anterior temporal lobe is thought to process integrative fine-grain
object discrimination, while the pSTS/MTG is thought to hold the multisensory
information, as is discussed in section 1.1.2. Considered as two semantic processing areas,
the left angular gyrus has been associated with complex information integration, general
semantic knowledge retrieval (Binder, et al., 2009), and the anterior temporal area has
been argued to be a supramodal hub for the processing of word meaning (Lambon Ralph
& Patterson, 2008; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007) based on neuropsychological and
neuroimaging findings. It is possible that the information from modality-specific systems
is converged and abstracted away from the perceptual or motoric symbols to form
supramodal symbols along two streams. This might explain why the left middle temporal
gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, which are located between the two terminals, play
important roles in distinguishing abstract and concepts (Chapter 3), and are suggested to
be more associated with the retrieval of concrete or abstract knowledge respectively
(Chapter 4).
The two terminals of the two streams are likely to serve different functions. The
left angular gyrus binds semantic information from multiple sensorimotor modalities,
whereas the roles of left anterior temporal lobe can be multifold: this area is crucial for
the triggering of detailed properties of concepts, and it may also “captures the semantic
similarities among concepts” (McClelland & Rogers, 2003), both of which facilitate the
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Figure 6.1
An illustrative hypothetical model of neuroanatomical systems involved in
conceptual representation. The blue circles indicate systems processing modality-specific
information. The yellow arrows indicate the streams along which information from
various sources are abstracted away from the original modalities or formats. The red
circles indicate supramodal systems severing different roles as labeled.
representation of semantically abstract concepts.
It should be noted that the inferences of the localization of semantic categories
were about the net, averaged effects on a coarse scale, rather than localizing semantic
concepts onto anatomy. Neural activity occurs on a scale that is not measureable by the
functional imaging techniques discussed in this dissertation, but multivariate patterns
strongly suggest that concept-sensitive regions are widespread and overlap across
different concepts. The preference of an area to certain categories of concepts does not
indicate the exclusiveness of either the function of the area, or the neural substrates of the
concepts.
In general, the current findings suggest widespread involvement of multiple
systems in conceptual representation. Modality-specific systems are the integral parts for
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semantic representation. The extent to which modality-specific systems are involved in
conceptual representations depends on the importance or salience of properties. The
supramodal processing is critical for representing abstract concepts. Perceptual and motor
information may also receive fine-grained processing and is abstracted to supramodal
symbols, depending on the task requirements.
6.2.

Future directions

6.2.1. From association to necessity
The MVPA approaches avoid the problem of reverse inference (Poldrack, et al.,
2009) while being powerful to detect small effects. However, as a neuroimaging data
analysis method, MVPA per se does not answer the question of the necessity for the
neural substrates to task performances. This leaves some issues about representational
differences of abstract vs. concrete concept unanswered, for example, whether the
concreteness effect will be diminished if the modality-specific representation is
unavailable? Behavioral measurements combined with techniques such as TMS may add
important further information to the necessity question and the specific roles of neural
correlates for conceptual representation.
6.2.2. Mechanisms underlying the fine-grained conceptual representation
Research on the organizational patterns of concepts may inspire the investigation
on the causes of such organizations. For instance, in the context of overlapping and
distributed patterns of conceptual representation, what drives objects from the same
domain to be close together is a question worth pursuing. The domain-specificity found
in certain regions has been proposed to emerge from their connectivity to other systems
that may play a critical role in the representation of the concepts (Mahon & Caramazza,
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2011). Further investigation on both the anatomical and functional connectivity
associated to conceptual representation will help testify these assumptions.
In spite of the progress in functional localization of knowledge representation, how
individual concepts, particularly concepts in the abstract domain, are processed in the
brain is far from clear. Based on the findings from multivariate pattern analysis, the
distinct patterns of activation within certain cortical regions may partly account for the
representation of various concepts. Behavioral and neuropsychological studies have
shown that our knowledge about objects or abstract entities can also be organized by
themes such as goals, plans, and situations (Crutch and Warrington 2005). The similaritybased multivoxel pattern analysis is a powerful tool to establish the representational
neighbors of concepts, which may further offer implications to the organizational
principles of concepts in the neural space. These approaches may also help the
investigation of the specific roles of supramodal areas in concepts processing.
Previous studies have focused on the differences between abstract and concrete
concepts by contrasting the processing of concepts with extreme high and low
concreteness. This approach is effective to locate the representational differences, but
insensitive to how the differences occur. Abstractness and concreteness are by definition
two ways to express the same continuum based on the two ends of it. The explanation of
identified areas relies on reverse inference, which is vulnerable to misinterpretation in the
face of multiple plausible options and the insufficient understanding about the identified
brain regions.
One alternative is to rethink the relations between abstract and concrete concepts
based on the general views on conceptual knowledge representation as a whole. For

111

example, the strong embodied view suggests the grounding nature of conceptual
knowledge including the abstract concepts. Considering the relatively better understood
neural substrates of concrete objects and modality-specific systems, it might be
informative to investigate whether and how these systems function or disconnect to the
concepts with increasing abstractness.
Introducing the amodal conceptual system has been considered as uninformative
expedients by proponents of radical embodied cognition. A possible approach to the
representation of abstract concept along the embodiment view is through conceptual
metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Recent behavioral studies have found supporting
evidence on concepts with medium abstractness. For example, processing verbs such as
rush and respect is found to activate image schemata of horizontal or vertical spatial
relations (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, & McRae, 2003). The speed of processing
sentence describing object or information transfer has been found to be modulated by the
consistency of the direction of physical movement of participants with the direction of
transfer implied in the sentence, and the sentence processing has also been found to be
affected by activity in the hand muscles (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Glenberg et al.,
2008), suggesting the association between the concept transfer and literal movement is
not merely the structural similarity between domains of concepts. However, the grounded
representations may not be applicable to other abstract concepts, and the core of concepts
like respect is more than a vertical relation.
The cross-modal MVPA, as was illustrated by the study in Chapter 5, is a suitable
tool to map the abstract concepts to concrete ones. For example, in research on
numerical-spatial concept relations, the role of spatial patterns in number coding was

112

demonstrated by a recent study that predicted the numerosity of dot sets based on fMRI
data in symbolic digits processing task (Eger et al., 2009). Another study showed the
possibility of predicting mental addition vs. subtraction by training the classifier on data
from a task of right vs. left eye movement (Knops, Thirion, Hubbard, Michel, & Dehaene,
2009). The authors suggested the results as evidence in align with the conceptual
mapping of small-to-large numbers onto left-to-right spatial patterns. Etzel and
colleagues (2008) trained the classifier on activity patterns in the premotor cortex when
participants heard sounds relating to hand or mouth actions, to predict the data when
participants performed hand or mouth actions. These examples suggest a potential
approach to addressing theoretical debates on embodied vs. amodal nature of cognitive
processing. In summary, combining the new approaches of measurement and analysis
with theoretical perspectives of linguistics and general cognitive models will be
promising future directions to further understand the representation of semantic
knowledge in the brain.
6.3.

General merits and contributions

This dissertation provided new and converging evidence for the representational
differences between abstract and concrete concepts from multiple perspectives. The
differences in the representation of abstract vs. concrete concepts were found to be
represented in a large number of single anatomical regions, as well as on the whole-brain
level, and voxelwise connectivity patterns. The representational differences were
suggested to occur at various levels, including the dependence on modality-specific
perceptual systems, the organization of associations among different semantic-related
systems, and the difficulty and strategy of retrieving contextual information.
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Methodologically, this dissertation illustrates the applications of MVPA to investigating
representation of semantic knowledge, based both on activation and condition-specific
functional connectivity data. The findings could inform theories of semantic knowledge
representation and understandings of functional anatomy of human brain.
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